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INTRODUCTION

Sports commentator Shawn Krest considers Lena Blackburne’s “Baseball
Rubbing Mud”2 to be “baseball’s dirty secret” and its application the “strangest
and least-understood ritual in baseball.”3 Admittedly, the thought that a baseball
may only be used in a game after “half-naked umps” or clubhouse attendants rub
mud on them appears strange.4 Considering that Russel Aubrey Blackburne and
his heirs have provided all of Major League Baseball (MLB) and Minor League
Baseball (MiLB) with the same special mud since the 1930s, the fact that the
reason for his nickname “Lena” is now lost to time seems the least odd aspect
surrounding the mud-rubbing ritual.5 Yet, it is not only the umpires’ different
techniques for applying the mud that give method to the madness. While new
white and shiny baseballs might be easy targets for batters, rubbing them with
mud provides the grip that certain pitchers require.6 Still, manually covering all
new baseballs in mud is “an odd, inconsistent, dirty practice.”7
However, legal commentators might call the baseball antitrust exemption,
baseball’s strangest and least-understood aspect, its other “dirty secret.” The
creation of this exemption through three Supreme Court rulings in the “baseball
trilogy,”8 and its subsequent application by the lower courts, is a similarly “odd,
inconsistent, and dirty practice.” As the name implies, the baseball antitrust
exemption relieves professional baseball from antitrust scrutiny. The
exemption’s odd and inconsistent character is made apparent since the Court
unequivocally subjects other professional sports,9 including team sports like
basketball10 or football,11 to antitrust laws. The dirty and muddied character of
2 See LENA BLACKBURNE BASEBALL RUBBING MUD, http://baseballrubbingmud.com (last
visited Sept. 25, 2019) (advertising and selling baseball rubbing mud).
3 Shawn Krest, Comment, Baseball’s Dirty Secret, N. ST. J. (June 13, 2018),
https://nsjonline.com/article/2018/06/baseballs-dirty-secret.
4 Id.; see OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES, 4.01(c) (OFF. OF THE COMM’R OF BASEBALL 2018)
(obligating umpires to ensure that all baseballs are “properly rubbed so that the gloss is
removed”).
5 Ron Shapella, The Real Dirt on Baseball’s Secret Delaware River Mud, PRINCETONINFO (July
1, 2015) https://princetoninfo.com/the-real-dirt-on-baseballs-secret-delaware-river-mud.
6 Krest, supra note 2.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., PETER A. CARFAGNA, SPORTS AND THE LAW: EXAMINING THE LEGAL
EVOLUTION OF AMERICA’S THREE “MAJOR LEAGUES” at 83 (3d ed. 2017); Rosby Carr III,
Comment, Another Failed Pickoff Attempt: The Latest Challenge to Major League Baseball’s Antitrust
Exemption, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 172 (2014).
9 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972).
10 Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
11 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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the exemption is clear from its very creation. After the Court issued a clean and
straightforward opinion in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs,12 muddled interpretations within scholarly discussion
shrouded what the Court had initially held.13 In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,14
the Supreme Court applied this muddled opinion to Federal Baseball. In Flood v.
Kuhn,15 the Court presented the “dirty” exemption in its “game-ready” form.
As the exemption approaches its arguable centennial,16 not only has there has
been an abundance of research published on the subject by scholarly
commentators,17 but the courts themselves have repeatedly engaged with the
exemption’s scope as well.18 Considering that Stuart Banner’s characterization of
the baseball antitrust exemption as “one of the oddest features of our legal
system”19 is among the more restrained descriptions of the exemption. Words
like “odd, inconsistent, and dirty”20 would not stand out from the legal discourse.
Eldon L. Ham compares the baseball trilogy to the Salem witch trials and Plessy
v. Ferguson,21 concluding that “the baseball antitrust boondoggle is no less obtuse
and begs for reversal.”22 He questions how one could “seriously trust the Court
when it rules on abortion, voting rights, presidential elections, hanging chads, or
more recently the Affordable Care Act” if it “officially pretend[s] baseball is not

12 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
13 See infra Section I.B. (scrutinizing the changing interpretation of Federal Baseball between
1922 and 1953).
14 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
15 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
16 See, e.g., Justin B. Bryant, Note, Analyzing the Scope of Major League Baseball’s Antitrust
Exemption in Light of San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1841, 1844 (2014) (stating the “antitrust exemption was born in 1922”); Ari Khuner
Haber, Comment, Keeping the A’s in Oakland: Franchise Relocation, City of San Jose, and the Broad
Power of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 22 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 44 (2014) (concluding “the
baseball exemption . . . was established . . . in 1922”). But see Joseph J. McMahon, Jr. & John
P. Rossi, A History and Analysis of Baseball’s Three Antitrust Exemptions, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.F. 213, 214–15 (1995) (characterizing this view as commonplace but erroneous). See generally
infra Part I (discussing different Supreme Court rulings as the exemption’s origin).
17 Cf. Nathaniel Grow, Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework for Determining
the Scope of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 560–61 n.8
(2010) (listing analyses of the baseball exemption in a footnote that exceeds an entire law
review page).
18 Cf. id. at 559–60 n.7 (listing seventeen instances when the lower courts ruled on the
exemption between 1960 and 2003).
19 STUART BANNER, THE BASEBALL TRUST: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION at xi (2013).
20 See Krest, supra note 2.
21 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
22 Eldon L. Ham, The Immaculate Deception: How the Holy Grail of Protectionism Led to the Great
Steroid Era, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 209, 212 (2008).
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a business subject to antitrust laws.”23 Judge Friendly mentioned that, “Federal
Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes’ happiest days.”24 In his concurrence
in Flood v. Kuhn, Judge Moore found the exemption turned baseball into “an
enclave or feudal barony.”25 Even the Supreme Court noted the exemption
might be “unrealistic, inconsistent, [and] illogical,”26 “an exception and an
anomaly,”27 and “an aberration.”28 Justice Douglas, who has the dubious honor
of being the only justice to encounter this issue twice while on the Court,
dissented in Flood, calling the exemption a “derelict in the stream of the law.”29
With the baseball trilogy, the Supreme Court “confounded courts and scholars
for generations.”30
This confusion led to three categories of legal articles, reflecting three distinct
foci of scholarly research on the exemption. Articles in the first category focus
on the exemption’s origins in the baseball trilogy.31 They either find that Toolson
created the baseball antitrust exemption32 or claim it did not exist before Flood.33
Both sides generally ignore the implications of their findings on the exemption’s
scope.34 While some notable exceptions in this category attempt to find logic
behind Federal Baseball,35 they still condemn the baseball trilogy en large.36

23 Eldon Ham, Pretext: The Dark Side of Baseball, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 15
(2014).
24 Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
25 Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1971) (Moore, J., concurring), aff’d, 407 U.S.
258 (1972).
26 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
27 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30 Bryant, supra note 15, at 1843.
31 See, e.g., generally Mitchell Nathanson, Who Exempted Baseball, Anyway? The Curious
Development of the Antitrust Exemption That Never Was, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1 (2013)
(conducting a historical analysis of the baseball trilogy).
32 E.g., Kevin McDonald, Antitrust and Baseball: Stealing Holmes, J. SUP. CT. HIST., Dec. 1998,
at 119–20.
33 E.g., Nathanson, supra note 30, at 43–44.
34 See, e.g., id. at 49–50 (concluding an analysis of the history of the baseball trilogy without
any regard to the exemption’s scope).
35 E.g., McDonald, supra note 31, at 89 (attempting to make sense of Federal Baseball with
the help of Justice Holmes’ legacy).
36 Id. at 119–22.
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Articles in the second category focus on the scope of the baseball antitrust
exemption.37 Due to a conventional simplification, based on a misinterpretation
of Toolson,38 articles in this category generally assume that Federal Baseball created
the exemption in 1922.39 Since Federal Baseball did not create an antitrust
exemption,40 even the most intellectually distinguished analyses based on this
premise provide diverging assessments and fail to provide a workable benchmark
for the courts.41
The third category of articles center on policy motivations for abolishing the
exemption.42 These articles largely share the erroneous presumption prevalent
among articles in the second category.43 These articles generally advocate
revoking the exemption for select policy reasons.44 This category also includes
those rare articles that defend the baseball exemption, albeit purely for policy
reasons.45 A thorough literature review of even the obsolete articles failed to
produce a favorable opinion of the baseball antitrust exemption per se, nor could
it produce an attempt to discover some structure underlying the trilogy.46 Even
an article co-authored by the former Commissioner of Baseball, Allan H. “Bud”

37 See generally Grow, Business of Baseball supra note 16 (rejecting the lower courts’ precedent
and defining the scope of the exemption as “the business of providing baseball entertainment
to the public.” Id. at 557.).
38 This view holds that Federal Baseball created the exemption and interprets Toolson as
narrowly upholding the earlier ruling. Section I.C.4.a infra refutes this interpretation of Toolson.
39 See sources cited supra note 16.
40 See infra Section I.A.4.
41 See Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 562 (finding the literature “conflicted”).
42 See, e.g., generally Brett Pollard, Note, Creating Economic Equality Among Major League Baseball
Franchises: The Removal of Major League Baseball’s Archaic Antitrust Exemption, 18 TEX. REV. ENT.
& SPORTS L. 49 (2016) (comparing dominant baseball teams to pre-Sherman Act commercial
monopolies).
43 See, e.g., Thor Klinker, Note, How Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Made It Hard for Iowans to Be
Baseball Fans and Why That Might Be Changing, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 883, 884 (2017) (noting that
“[i]n 1922, . . . Federal Baseball . . . provided the precedent on which today’s . . . antitrust
exemption exists”).
44 See, e.g., generally id.(citing the MLB’s blackout policies for broadcasting agreements as a
reason for abolishing the exemption).
45 See, e.g., generally Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM. BUS.
L.J. 211 (2012) (defending the exemption for several policy reasons); see generally Bradley V.
Murphy, Note, Protecting America’s Pastime: The Necessity of Major League Baseball’s Antitrust
Exemption for the Survival of Minor League Baseball, 49 IND. L. REV. 793, 798–800 (2016)
(defending it as a prerequisite for the existence of the minor leagues); cf. Gary Roberts, On the
Scope and Effect of Baseball’s Antitrust Exclusion, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 321, 335–36 (1994)
(advising “Congress [to] disregard the largely insignificant baseball antitrust exclusion” because
abolishing it “would create more legal confusion and chaos than predictable benefits”).
46 As Section II.A infra shows, early commentators considered Federal Baseball an
uncontroversial and well-reasoned part of the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence that
created no exemption. Since Toolson, the courts and scholarly commentators agree in their
contempt for the baseball antitrust exemption and the underlying decisions.
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Selig, only looks at the effects of the antitrust exemption while abstaining from
any systematic considerations.47
This article conducts a systematic, methodological, and historical analysis of
the baseball trilogy to elucidate its underlying structure. It adds to the existing
scholarship by analyzing the later decisions in the context of their predecessors
and exposing the interplay within the baseball trilogy. As a result, this article
argues, against nearly universal opposition, that the Supreme Court issued wellconsidered opinions in each case and created a logical structure that underlies the
entire trilogy. This article then scrutinizes the different approaches taken by the
lower courts to delimitate the baseball antitrust exemption. It uses its structural
findings on the baseball trilogy to evaluate the validity of these approaches. The
article then examines the valid features of each approach in order to provide a
benchmark to understand the full scope of the antitrust exemption.
The introduction to Part I briefly summarizes the reserve system in
professional baseball, a major factual motivation in all three cases.48 Thereafter,
the article individually scrutinizes the rulings in Federal Baseball,49 Toolson,50 and
Flood.51 The analysis of the two later rulings highlights their relationship with
their predecessors in order to elucidate the structure behind the baseball trilogy.
The article also surveys the changing interpretation of Federal Baseball before
Toolson so as to examine the exemption’s origins.52
Part II begins with an evaluation of legislative action’s impact on the scope
of baseball’s antitrust exemption.53 The article then engages with the lower
courts’ rulings that have restricted the exemption to baseball’s reserve system,54
to the business of baseball,55 and to baseball’s unique characteristics and needs.56
To ensure faithful representation, the article lays out the relevant cases and
examines their reasoning and compliance with the baseball trilogy.
Part III derives the scope of the antitrust exemption from a consolidation of
the lower courts’ precedents.57 First, it proposes a test for future courts to apply

47 See Allan H. (“Bud”) Selig & Matthew J. Mitten, Baseball Jurisprudence: Its Effects on America’s
Pastime and Other Professional Sports Leagues, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1171, 1182–92 (2018).
48 See infra Part I.
49 See infra Section I.A.
50 See infra Section I.C.
51 See infra Section I.D.
52 See infra Section I.B.
53 See infra Part II.
54 See infra Section II.A.
55 See infra Section II.B.
56 See infra Section II.C.
57 See infra Part III.
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the baseball antitrust exemption and presents a benchmark for the business of
baseball.58 Then, the article applies that test to different questions of substantive
law59 and the relationship between the exemption and general state antitrust
laws.60 Finally, Part IV concludes the article by summarizing its findings on the
baseball antitrust exemption and its underlying trilogy.61
II.

THE BASEBALL TRILOGY

All three cases in the trilogy originate in baseball’s “reserve system,” which
emerged from an 1879 agreement between the team owners in the National
League.62 Under the reserve system, team owners had the right to “reserve” their
players, making them ineligible to play for another team, and could sell reserved
players at will.63 Seemingly, the owners’ rights to reserve a player were limited,
for players only signed one-year contracts that gave the team a renewal option
for the following year.64 However, if a player wanted to play baseball in the
second year, he had to sign a new contract with the same clause, giving the club
a renewal option for the third year, and so on, ad infinitum.65 Not even sitting out
a year could grant baseball players free agency, which would allow them to sign
with any team.66
Under the “National Agreement,” the teams in the two dominant major
leagues, the National League and the American League, respected each other’s
reservations.67 Combined into “Organized Baseball,”68 they left professional
baseball players no reasonable alternative but to comply with the reserve
system.69 Baseball players were “essentially bound for life to the team that first
signed [them]”70 and could “[be] sold for as little as 25 cents and traded for a
bulldog, a bird dog, a turkey, and an airplane.”71 The owners even sold celebrity

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B–D.
60 See infra Section III.E.
61 See infra Part IV.
62 See BANNER, supra note 18, at 1.
63 See id. at 4–6.
64 See Jay H. Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sports, 58 YALE L.J. 691, 697 (1949).
65 Id. at 697–98.
66 BANNER, supra note 18, at 6.
67 CARFAGNA, supra note 7, at 83.
68 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 202, 205, 206 (1922) (showing both the plaintiff and Organized Baseball using that term).
69 BANNER, supra note 18, at 23.
70 Colleen Ganin, Note, With San José at Bat, Federal Baseball is in the Bottom of the Ninth, 56
ARIZ. L. REV. 1129, 1137 (2014).
71 KENNETH M. JENNINGS, BALLS AND STRIKES: THE MONEY GAME IN PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL 181 (1990).
58
59
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players without their consent or prior knowledge.72 Consequently, in an
assessment broadly shared by the general public,73 baseball players considered
the reserve system akin to chattel slavery.74
The system would eventually find its demise in the 1975 MessersmithMcNally arbitration, when arbitrator Seitz held that sitting out one year granted
MLB players free agency.75 Less than four years after the final ruling in the
baseball trilogy, this arbitration provided MLB players with an exit from the
reserve system.76 As a result, the MLB and the Major League Baseball Players’
Association (MLBPA) negotiated for the end of the system for MLB players. 77
Unfortunately, for MiLB players, the reserve system still exists.78
A. FEDERAL BASEBALL CLUB OF BALTIMORE, INC. V. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS

Despite the plight of the players in this system, it was not a baseball player,
but a team from a third major league, that carried the first antitrust suit against
Organized Baseball to the Supreme Court.79 In Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore,

72 See, e.g., infra Section I.D.1 (analyzing the facts behind Flood, including the sale of star
player Curt Flood from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies).
73 See Murray Chass, Baseball’s Abraham Lincoln, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1979, at C13
(characterizing arbitrator Seitz, who would eventually grant free agency to MLB players after
they sat out one year, as “Baseball’s Abraham Lincoln”); BANNER, supra note 18, at 101 (citing
1949 newspaper articles that, referring to the Circuit decision analyzed in Section I.B.2 infra,
compared Danny Gardella to a victorious Dred Scott and MLB team owners to preAbolishment Southern planters). But see Ron Briley, Danny Gardella and Baseball’s Reserve Clause,
in SPORTS AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INTERSECTIONS 57, 70 (Samuel O.
Regalado & Sarah K. Fields eds., 2014) (citing articles from the same period in favor of the
reserve system).
74 For example, Curt Flood referred to himself as “a well-paid slave” during the events that
led to Flood. BANNER, supra note 18, at 190. An essay that has been attributed to John Ward
compared the reserve system to slavery as early as 1889. National Brotherhood of Ball Players,
Brotherhood Manifesto, in EARLY INNINGS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BASEBALL 188, 188–
89 (Dean A. Sullivan ed., 1997).
75 Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. 101, 118 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.).
76 Id. at 164–65.
77 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 585–86.
78 See Russel Yavner, Minor League Baseball and the Competitive Balance: Examining the Effects of
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 5 HARV. J. SPORTS. & ENT. L. 265, 288–94 (2014) (analyzing the
MiLB reserve system).
79 Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922). The first antitrust challenge to the reserve system, American League Baseball Club of
Chicago v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914), did not reach the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Inc. v. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs,80 the first case of the baseball
trilogy, the Supreme Court ruled on an antitrust claim brought by the Baltimore
Terrapins,81 a team from the now defunct Federal League, against the National
and American Leagues. The Terrapins claimed a violation of federal antitrust
laws, so they had to prove a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint
of trade” existed, which had been prohibited by the Sherman Act since 1890.82
The Act makes it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt . . . or conspire . . . to
monopolize . . . trade.”83 If the Sherman Act is violated, the claimant is entitled
to “threefold the damages . . . sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee” pursuant to the Clayton Act.84
While a literal interpretation of the Sherman Act would prohibit any contract
or combination between separate entities in restraint of interstate commerce, 85
the Act was intended to prevent “only unreasonable restraints.”86 If the courts
do not find conduct unreasonable per se, they apply the “rule of reason” test to
scrutinize its legality under the Sherman Act.87 An activity is illegal per se if it is
“so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to
establish [its] illegality.”88 For instance, a price-fixing cartel is always illegal.89
However, the scope of the subjects that courts consider per se illegal have been
decreasing.90 Under the rule of reason test, “the factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case to decide whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”91

Fed. Base Ball, 259 U.S. 200.
See BANNER, supra note 18, at 61 (analyzing intentions and ownership structure of “the
Baltimore Terrapins”).
82 Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–7, 26 Stat. 209, 209–10(1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–7 (2018)).
83 15 U.S.C. § 2.
84 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27
(2018)).
85 CARFAGNA, supra note 7, at 120.
86 State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
87 See PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶ 1500 (4th ed. 2017).
88 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (quoting Nat’l Soc. of Prof Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)); see generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 86,
at ¶ 1509 (analyzing classes of commercial activity that are per se illegal).
89 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
90 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2018); see, e.g., Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (subjecting prior per se illegal
vertical price restraints to the rule of reason test), overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D.
Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); see also State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (same
for vertical maximum price fixing), overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
91 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see Standard Oil Co. v.
United States 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (establishing the rule of reason); see also CARFAGNA, supra note
7, at 121–22 (discussing the rule of reason test in the context of sports law).
80
81
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Nevertheless, federal antitrust jurisdiction, like all federal powers, is restricted
to matters the Constitution specifically subjects to federal jurisdiction.92
Congressional jurisdiction over antitrust matters is derived from the Commerce
Clause and is thus limited to interstate commerce.93 While the Commerce Clause
grants power that “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution,”94
the Supreme Court’s definition of interstate commerce has varied significantly
over time.95 After initially distinguishing transportation within a state that is part
of interstate commerce from intrastate commerce under state jurisdiction,96 the
Court extended federal jurisdiction over intrastate activities with “a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce.”97 After excluding manufacturing
and agriculture from its definition of commerce,98 the Court extended
congressional power over wheat grown on a farm for consumption thereon.99
However, when the Supreme Court ruled on Federal Baseball, it still interpreted
the Commerce Clause with “a narrow, parochial view of commerce.”100
1. Facts
Federal Baseball was decided in 1913 when the upstart Federal League began
organizing professional baseball games. After this league was barred from joining
the National Agreement, it challenged the reserve system. Competition for
professional baseball players led to significant salary increases, and Organized
Baseball’s economic superiority snuffed out the Federal League in 1915.101 Under
a “Peace Agreement” with Organized Baseball, the owners of the Federal teams
were paid to dissolve their league.102

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
94 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).
95 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (examining the development of Supreme
Court precedent on congressional power pursuant to the Commerce Clause while restricting
that power for the first time since the New Deal); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 286 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding that “the whole concept of commerce has changed” between
1922 and 1953); see generally Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (1996) (analyzing the history of Supreme Court decisions on the
Commerce Clause).
96 Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1.
97 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
98 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
99 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
100 Flood, 407 U.S. 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101 See Nathanson, supra note 30, at 8.
102 CARFAGNA, supra note 7, at 83.
92
93
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Most Federal League teams joined that agreement, but the Baltimore
Terrapins did not participate in the buyout.103 While some commentators believe
that Baltimore declined an offer from Organized Baseball,104 the transcript from
the negotiations implies that they were never offered a share of the sum paid to
the owner of the Federal teams under the Peace Agreement.105 The other Federal
League teams ultimately offered Baltimore $50,000 “as its ‘equitable distribution’
of the league’s value.”106 In comparison, Robert Ward, owner of the Brooklyn
Tip-Tops, had received $400,000 for dissolving his team.107 The Pittsburgh
Rebels had agreed to $50,000, but the Terrapins were owned by approximately
600 investors from Baltimore, who were determined to bring a major league team
back to their home city.108
To that end, they pursued the antitrust claim on their own, suing Organized
Baseball. After dropping a first suit filed in Philadelphia, the Terrapins filed a
second in Washington, which would eventually reach the Supreme Court.109
After the judge’s instruction that Organized Baseball was engaged in interstate
commerce and “attempted to monopolize, and did monopolize, a part of that
commerce, principally through what is called the ‘reserve clause,’”110 the jury only
had to decide the amount of the Terrapin’s damages.111 Consequently, the jury
ruled in favor of the Terrapins, fixed their damages at $80,000, and granted them
a judgment of $240,000 plus $24,000 in legal fees.112 However, the D.C. Circuit
reversed on appeal, finding that professional baseball did not constitute interstate
commerce.113
2. The Terrapins’ Argument
In their antitrust claim, the Terrapins alleged several monopolistic behaviors
by Organized Baseball.114 Their main claim was that Organized Baseball had
“destroyed the Federal League by buying up some of the constituent clubs and
. . . inducing all those clubs except the plaintiff to leave their League. . . .”115
BANNER, supra note 18, at 61; Nathanson, supra note 30, at 8.
Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 566.
105 Samuel A. Alito, Jr., The Origin of the Baseball Antitrust Exemption: Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 34 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 183,
189 (2009).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 BANNER, supra note 18, at 60.
109 Id. at 64–66.
110 Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269 F. 681, 684
(1920).
111 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 8.
112 Fed. Baseball, 269 F. 682.
113 Id. at 684-88.
114 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 207 (1922) (finding the extent of alleged anticompetitive activities “unnecessary to
repeat”).
115 Id. at 207
103
104
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Because Organized Baseball’s monopolistic nature was undisputed, both parties
centered their briefs on professional baseball’s classification as interstate
commerce.116 The Terrapins’ argument for professional baseball’s interstate
character drew lines between Organized Baseball and baseball players, and
between the business of baseball and the game of baseball (which was but one part
of the business), in order to determine “whether the monopoly which [the
American and National Leagues] had established or attempted to establish was a
monopoly of any part of interstate commerce.”117 While players who engage only
in sport activities conduct no business, the leagues are “voluntary associations
and corporations engaged upon a vast scale, involving the investment of millions
of dollars, in the business of providing, by the transportation from State to State
of baseball teams and their necessary attendants and equipment, exhibitions of
professional baseball.”118 Thus, professional baseball leagues are not engaged in
sports, but “in a money-making business enterprise in which all of the features
of any large commercial undertaking are to be found.”119 The Terrapins showed
that while commerce is ordinarily based on transporting merchandise, “there are
countless forms in which it may be carried on without traffic in such articles.”120
They conceded that personal effort is not “an article of commerce,” but claimed it
could “often [be] commerce itself.”121
Even the personality of each individual team has an interstate character
because teams depend on each other to continuously cross state lines.122 The
Terrapins contended that if having a single distinct part in a single state would
suffice to keep a business intrastate, even the American Tobacco Company
would not be engaged in interstate commerce.123 Because the short duration of
each game is the only time professional baseball teams are not crossing state
borders, the business of baseball is interstate in nature.124
The Terrapins supported this argument by stressing that millions of people
follow the games from other states through newspapers and telegraphs, and

116 See Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 206 (showing Organized Baseball’s argument that seeking to
contract with every professional baseball player “is not an attempt to monopolize commerce”
(emphasis added)); see also infra Section I.A.3 (analyzing Organized Baseball’s argument in
Federal Baseball).
117 Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 201.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 202.
120 Id. at 203 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
121 Id. (emphasis added).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 204.
124 Id.
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some travel considerable distances to watch games in other states.125
Additionally, the business of baseball might not be interstate simply because the
National and American Leagues acquire baseballs for the supply of their
respective teams. However, shipping these baseballs across state lines adds to the
existing interstate character.126 The business of baseball is interstate commerce
and therefore subject to federal antitrust scrutiny.
3. Organized Baseball’s Argument
Organized Baseball contested the characterization of baseball as a form of
interstate commerce.127 Lead appellate attorney George Wharton Pepper
highlighted that the only court to rule on the relationship between baseball and
federal antitrust laws had found baseball outside the scope of the Sherman Act.128
He claimed that Congress had not regulated the interstate movement of baseball
players and that an activity does not turn interstate “merely because people came
from another State to do it.”129 In an attempt to portray Organized Baseball as
“anything but a formally-structured business,” Pepper generally referred to his
client as “organized baseball,” using the lower-case form “whenever [its]
corporate structure was discussed.”130 When Supreme Court rules required the
heading to his first argument to be in all-caps, he referred to his client as
“ORGANIZED BASEBALL, SO CALLED.”131
In his brief, Pepper also implored the Supreme Court to relieve baseball from
federal antitrust scrutiny regardless of its character.132 “[T]he Sherman Act
should not be construed to apply to a combination absolutely essential to the
existence of so obviously a wholesome and popular sporting event as the world’s
series.”133 Pepper “contend[ed] that in order to conduct the business of providing
exhibitions of professional baseball,” Organized Baseball would have to
monopolize “every concern in that business in the whole country.”134 Pepper’s
plea was based on the assumption that baseball’s unique characteristics and needs
would justify and necessitate exemption from the antitrust laws.135

Id. at 205.
Id.
127 Id. at 206.
128 Id. (citing Am. League Baseball Club of Chi. v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914)).
129 Id. at 206–07.
130 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 16.
131 Brief on Behalf of Defendants In Error at 45, Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (No. 204).
132 See id. at 68–72.
133 Id. at 72.
134 Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff In Error at 164, Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (No. 204).
135 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 13–14.
125
126
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Yet, the Supreme Court found Pepper’s main argument to be that “[p]ersonal
effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce.”136 Because
baseball players do not produce any tangible goods during a game, their personal
effort to win is not a subject of commerce. Thus, the Court found that the
business of baseball was not a unique part of interstate commerce, but rather was
not a part of interstate commerce at all.
4. The Opinion of the Court
Pepper would highlight years later that Justice Holmes adopted his phrase
verbatim on personal effort when he wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court
in Federal Baseball.137 Even beyond that effort’s legal character, Justice Holmes
relied extensively on Organized Baseball’s brief.138 Consistent with this
preference for the defendants’ position, the Supreme Court adopted most of
Pepper’s arguments.139
The Court saw the deciding factor in Federal Baseball as that “of the nature of
the business involved,”140 that is, the business of baseball. If this business was
uncommercial in nature, it was not under federal jurisdiction pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. However, if the business of baseball constituted commerce,
it was subject to the Sherman Act unless the Supreme Court issued a policy
decision granting Pepper’s plea for an exemption from federal antitrust scrutiny.
After laying out the leagues’ general structure, Justice Holmes defined
business of baseball as “giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state
affairs,”141 that is, as being intrastate, not interstate, in nature. Quoting Pepper’s
“personal effort” phrase and finding that playing baseball is not related to
production, the Court held that a baseball game does not qualify as commerce.142
Because the essential part of the business of baseball is organizing games, which
are neither interstate nor commerce in nature, the business of baseball does not
constitute interstate commerce.
Furthermore, in the same way that a law firm does not engage in interstate
commerce by sending a lawyer across state borders to argue a single case,
transporting baseball players to another state to play a game, by its very nature,
Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 206 (1922).
Lee Allen, Radio and Video Have Not Altered Game, Says Pepper, SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 25,
1953, at 3; see Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 209 (showing Justice Holmes quoting Pepper’s phrase),
see also id. at 206 (showing the phrase in Pepper’s argument).
138 See Nathanson, supra note 30, at 14–19 (analyzing Organized Baseball’s brief in Federal
Baseball and its influence on the Court’s opinion).
139 Id. at 19–20.
140 Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 209.
136
137
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does not alter the character of the underlying business.143 Thus, “the fact that in
order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state
lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change the
character of the business.”144
Finally, the Court held that “[a]ccording to the distinction insisted upon in
Hooper v. California . . . the transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing.”145
Furthermore, “[t]hat which in its consummation is not commerce does not
become commerce among the States because the transportation that we have
mentioned takes place.”146 Even if transportation across state borders did affect
the character of an activity, the transportation of baseball players would be too
peripheral to the fundamental game of baseball to have any effect on the
business’s intrastate nature.
In short, the Supreme Court found that the business of baseball does not
constitute interstate commerce because its essential part, the game of baseball, is
neither interstate nor commerce. The only cross-border activity in the business
of baseball, transporting players to the games, is alone insufficient to affect the
character of that business. Even if transportation did alter the nature of a
business, transporting baseball players to other states is too incidental to the
business to change its character. Because the business of baseball did not
constitute interstate commerce, Organized Baseball was excepted from all federal
antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act. However, the Court did not hold
Organized Baseball exempt from federal antitrust scrutiny or endow professional
baseball with any rights sui generis.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL BASEBALL

The Court’s opinion in this respect is consistent with modern analyses of
Federal Baseball that simply consider the case as an interpretation of the
Commerce Clause.147 Eventually, the dominant opinion interpreted Federal
Baseball as having created an antitrust exemption.148 It “must surely have been a
surprise to the commentators of the 1920s and ‘30, who paid the case little

Id.
Id. at 208–09.
145 Id. at 209 (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895)) (internal citations
omitted).
146 Id.
147 See Nathanson, supra note 30, at 20–24; Edgar Bronson Tolman, Review of Recent Supreme
Court Decisions, 8 A.B.A.J. 490, 494 (1922) (stating the Supreme Court ruled in Federal Baseball
that professional baseball is not subject to the Sherman Act because it does not constitute
interstate commerce); see also Gilbert H. Montague, Anti-Trust Laws and the Federal Trade
Commission, 1914–1927, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 668–69 (1927) (finding the Supreme Court’s
ruling on Federal Baseball consistent with its other rulings on the Commerce Clause).
148 See infra Section I.B.1.
143
144
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mind”149 when even the Supreme Court adopted this interpretation of Federal
Baseball “and render[ed] it, three decades hence, the most significant baseballrelated decision in American jurisprudence.”150
1. Scholarly Debate
The shift in scholarly interpretation of Federal Baseball originated not in
changes to the law but in economic and societal factors unrelated to the baseball
antitrust exemption, namely, the Great Depression.151 The resulting labor
movement led to the Wagner Act, which incentivizes employers to collectively
bargain with organized labor unions.152 Under these circumstances, the public
began to view professional baseball players as laborers instead of just athletes.153
In 1937, when the U.S. Attorney General opined that Organized Baseball was
not subject to federal antitrust scrutiny, Congressman Raymond Cannon
introduced a resolution on the House floor, proposing that baseball players be
treated as organized laborers and inquiring into Organized Baseball’s labor
practices.154 While this resolution did not lead to definitive congressional action,
it started a debate as to whether Federal Baseball had created an antitrust
exemption for professional baseball or merely acknowledged its intrastate
character.155
In 1941, Marcus Cohn compared professional baseball to other types of
entertainment without acknowledging a general exemption.156 His article
scrutinizes a 1918 ruling, which held the business model of the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) did not constitute restraint of
trade.157 Cohn highlights that an interstate activity is only subject to the Sherman
Act if it constitutes commerce.158 Thus, by holding that entertainment businesses
such as that of the ASCAP are “personal effort,” not “commerce,” the Court

149 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 32; see infra Sections I.C–D (analyzing the subsequent rulings
in the baseball trilogy).
150 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 40.
151 Id. at 24.
152 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2018).
153 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 24.
154 Id. at 24–25.
155 Id. at 25.
156 Marcus Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act, 29 GEO. L.J. 407 (1941).
157 174th St. & St. Nicholas Ave. Amusement Co. v. Maxwell, 169 N.Y. Supp. 895 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1918).
158 Cohn, supra note 155, at 426.
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excludes them from the Sherman Act.159 However, Cohn contends that the way
“[r]adio and theatrical entertainment”160 had changed in the decade preceding his
article “may well lead a court to rule that the performance of music is now
commerce.”161 By presenting baseball as another example for an entertainment
business based on “artistic or literary expression,”162 Cohn implies that Federal
Baseball might be similarly obsolete.163
Yet, five years later, Bernard Reich found in a similar analysis that “[v]ague
reference to new conditions and the expanding scope of interstate commerce”
were insufficient reasons to apply the Sherman Act to professional baseball
without overruling Federal Baseball outright.164 Despite not using the term
“exemption,” his article argues that technological and societal advances would
not affect the inapplicability of federal antitrust laws to professional baseball
under Federal Baseball.165 One year after Reich’s analysis, John W. Neville again
argued that “Federal Baseball . . . [was] a decision on baseball of another age” and
provided no reason to “maintain that baseball is not commerce, and is therefore
exempt from antitrust law enforcement.”166 While Neville rejected the notion
that baseball would be “exempt” from antitrust scrutiny, he was the first to use
that term in regard to Federal Baseball.167
2. Gardella v. Chandler
Before the Supreme Court exempted professional baseball from antitrust
scrutiny in Toolson,168 the case of Danny Gardella “spurred [a] flurry of interest
in the meaning of Federal Baseball . . . crystallize[d] the debate and set the stage
for the Toolson decision.”169 In February of 1947, Gardella was the first MLB
player to sign with a Mexican team, and was consequently banned from playing
for Organized Baseball when he returned to the U.S.170 When Gardella sued for
reinstatement, Judge Goddard dismissed the case, albeit not without
acknowledging the dilemma between the precedent of Federal Baseball and the

Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 427.
161 Id. at 428.
162 Id. at 427.
163 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 26.
164 Bernard Reich, The Entertainment Industry and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 20 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 34 (1946).
165 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 27.
166 John W. Neville, Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 16 FORDHAM L. REV. 208, 230 (1947).
167 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 27–28.
168 See infra Sections I.C.4.c-d (showing that Toolson created the baseball antitrust exemption);
but see sources cited supra note 15 (arguing that the exemption exists since 1922 when the
Supreme Court ruled on Federal Baseball).
169 Id. at 28.
170 BANNER, supra note 18, at 97–98.
159
160
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Supreme Court’s changed definition of interstate commerce.171
That dilemma became even more apparent as Gardella v. Chandler reached the
Second Circuit.172 Before ruling on the case, Judge Chase stated that Federal
Baseball had not been overruled and was therefore binding for the Circuit. 173
Conversely, Judge Frank gave examples of “a lower court announcing that a
Supreme Court decision is dead,” which would allow the Circuit to overrule
Federal Baseball, but then admitted that was irrelevant because professional
baseball had since become interstate commerce.174 Both judges adhered to their
respective opinions when ruling on the case, with Judge Chase finding it their
“duty as a subordinate court . . . to follow the Federal Base Ball Club Case”175
and Judge Frank calling Federal Baseball an “impotent zombi [sic]” without any
legal effect.176
The decision now depended on Judge Learned Hand, who took the
intermediate position.177 In his memorandum, he agreed with Judge Frank that
the lower courts may occasionally rule against obsolete Supreme Court
precedent.178 Yet, he emphasized the unanimity in that opinion as an argument
against finding Federal Baseball obsolete.179 Moreover, the unsystematic Supreme
Court antitrust precedent made any prediction on how the Court would rule, “a
game of blind-man’s-bluff.”180 Thus, Judge Hand initially voted with Judge
Chase.181 Yet, when the court published its decision, he found the issue was not
a legal question, but a factual one, of whether the business of baseball had
become interstate commerce, proceeding to vote with Judge Frank.182 After the
Circuit remanded the case to the trial court, Gardella settled out of court and
received $60,000 in exchange for dropping his suit.183

171 Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see BANNER, supra note 18,
at 98 (analyzing the reasoning of Judge Goddard); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text
(analyzing the historical development of the Supreme Court’s definition of interstate
commerce).
172 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
173 See BANNER, supra note 18, at 98–99 (analyzing the Chase memorandum on Gardella).
174 See id. at 99 (analyzing the Frank memorandum on Gardella).
175 Gardella, 172 F.2d at 405.
176 Id. at 408–09 (Frank, J., concurring).
177 See BANNER, supra note 18, at 99–101.
178 Id. at 99–100.
179 Id. at 100.
180 See id. at 99–100 (quoting the Hand memorandum on Gardella).
181 Id. at 99.
182 Gardella, 172 F.2d at 407–08 (Hand, J., concurring).
183 BANNER, supra note 18, at 103.
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As the first successful antitrust claim against Organized Baseball since 1922,
Gardella “struck terror in the hearts of club owners,” who feared for the end of
the reserve system.184 Yet, the legal community was divided in its assessment.
For instance, Robert S. Gottesmann concluded in 1952 that, after Gardella,
“Organized Baseball’s present interstate features combined with its monopolistic
practices are sufficient to bring it within the antitrust acts. Future exemptions
from these statutes . . . should be made by Congressional enactment and not by
the courts.”185 Similarly, Alison Reppy found in a 1949 article that as a result of
the advent of radio and television, Gardella held that “modern organized baseball
was engaged in interstate commerce.”186 She dismissed the reasoning in Judge
Chase’s dissent as being “hardly tenable, [considering] the common law concept
of restraint.”187
John Eckler, in contrast, seconded Judge Chase one year later, even if first
conceding that baseball might have become an interstate activity by 1950.188
Eckler added, however, that “[b]y no standard, however elastic, can baseball be
considered such ‘trade or commerce’ as regulated by the Sherman Act.”189
Therefore, baseball cannot become subject to antitrust scrutiny, societal and
technological advances notwithstanding. Federal Baseball created a unique
exemption from antitrust scrutiny that is required for the very existence of
“baseball as we know it.”190 Eventually, this “revisionist” interpretation would
begin to prevail.191
C. TOOLSON V. NEW YORK YANKEES, INC.

Because baseball’s antitrust exemption was to stand “[u]ntil . . . overruled or
distinguished,”192 the Supreme Court had three options when it ruled on Toolson
v. New York Yankees, Inc.,193 the second case in the baseball trilogy. First, it could
uphold Federal Baseball. Because Federal Baseball was a constitutional decision,194
this option would have effectively created a perpetual exemption since the
Court’s power of judicial review bars Congress from overruling constitutional

Id. at 101.
Robert S. Gottesmann, Monopolies–Interstate Commerce–Organized Baseball, 1 BUFF. L. REV.
342, 344 (1952).
186 Alison Reppy, Constitutional Law, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 956, 974 (1949).
187 Id.
188 John Eckler, Baseball— Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 56, 65 (1950).
189 Id. at 66.
190 Id. at 78.
191 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 31.
192 Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J.
576, 609 (1953).
193 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
194 See supra Section I.A.4.
184
185
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decisions.195 Thus, an exemption based on Federal Baseball would have been
outside of congressional jurisdiction.
Moreover, overruling that exemption without violating fundamental
principles of law and logic would have been nearly impossible for the Supreme
Court. During the period between Federal Baseball and Toolson, the nation was
experiencing great socioeconomic change, including the advent of radio and
television,196 and the Depression-era extension of federal jurisdiction pursuant
to the Commerce Clause.197 By upholding Federal Baseball, the Supreme Court
would have implicitly held these developments insufficient to render the case
obsolete. Hence, the Court could only abolish the exemption after
socioeconomic changes with even further reaching consequences. In turn,
abolishing the exemption would impact Organized Baseball even more
powerfully at the time of Toolson than it would have during the Federal Baseball
decision itself.
Second, the Court could overrule Federal Baseball. Because “[j]udicial decisions
have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years,”198 this would allow
thousands of players to sue under the Sherman Act for threefold the damages
received due to their lack of negotiation power, potentially ruining Organized
Baseball.199 Third, the Toolson Court could have found Federal Baseball obsolete
and abolished the exemption.
1. Facts
Toolson originated in 1949 when George Earl Toolson was a pitcher for the
Newark Bears, a AAA affiliate of the New York Yankees.200 The Bears folded
after the 1949 season, and the Yankees assigned Toolson to their A affiliate, the
Binghamton Triplets.201 After he sat out of the 1950 season in an attempt to gain
free agency, Toolson filed suit against the Yankees in Los Angeles, claiming that
they violated the Sherman Act by not letting him play for a team other than the
Triplets.202 The trial court dismissed his claim, as did the trial court in Gardella’s

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
See McDonald, supra note 31, at 112–13 (analyzing the growing importance of radio and
television for professional baseball between 1922 and 1953).
197 See sources cited supra note 94 (analyzing the development of the Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
198 Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
199 BANNER, supra note 18, at 121–22.
200 Id. at 112.
201 Id.
202 Id.
195
196
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case. Unlike Gardella though, the Circuit affirmed the dismissal.203 The ensuing
circuit split supported Toolson’s plea for certiorari; that plea was successful, and
the Supreme Court heard his case.204
2. Toolson’s Argument
Toolson’s primary argument was the same one Judge Frank had made in
Gardella.205 Toolson claimed that technological and societal changes that
occurred between 1922 and 1953 had rendered Federal Baseball obsolete.206 The
technological advances brought by the advent of radio and television enabled
baseball fans to follow the game from another state. The societal changes
following the Great Depression and the New Deal, as well as a broader
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, required the extension of federal
antitrust scrutiny to professional baseball. Thus, “[e]ven if the Federal Baseball
Club case . . . were correctly decided on its facts it [was] not applicable to the . . .
situation and facts” of 1953.207 Toolson’s secondary argument, however,
contended that Federal Baseball was not even correctly decided at the time.208
In his main argument, Toolson highlighted that Congress did not consider
Federal Baseball important when the 82nd Congressional House Subcommittee on
the Study of Monopoly Power found the decision did not bar it from
investigating and regulating professional baseball.209 If Congress assumed that
Federal Baseball excluded professional baseball from the scope of the Commerce
Clause, the Subcommittee could not have started investigations due to lack of
jurisdiction. By engaging with the subject, Congress showed that it found Federal
Baseball to only mean professional baseball did not qualify as interstate commerce
in 1922.
Toolson then disputed whether baseball’s unique characteristics and needs
warranted exemption from antitrust scrutiny,210 countering not only the Yankees’
argument in his case but also Pepper’s final argument in Federal Baseball,

Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356–57.
See Nathanson, supra note 30, at 32 (“By the time the Supreme Court’s briefing schedule
had been established, the petitioners were swimming upstream against a heavy current. . . .
[Toolson] framed the issue as a fundamental circuit split.”).
205 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (analyzing Judge Frank’s reasoning in
Gardella).
206 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953) (per curiam) (No. 647).
207 Brief in Support of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted).
208 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 205, at 11–12.
209 Id. at 13.
210 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief on Writ of Certiorari at 47, Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam) (No. 18) (quoting Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d. 402,
409 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J., concurring).
203
204
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unadopted by Justice Holmes.211 Toolson argued that baseball was like any other
kind of entertainment and was subject to antitrust scrutiny. 212 Again quoting
Judge Frank’s opinion in Gardella, Toolson claimed that “if the players be
regarded as quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they are well paid; only the
totalitarian-minded will believe that high pay excuses virtual slavery.”213
As far as Toolson followed Judge Frank’s lead from Gardella, he simply had
to show that the economic and societal changes between 1922 and 1953 made
Federal Baseball inapplicable to his case. Toolson also claimed in his plea for
certiorari, however, that Federal Baseball had been wrong in 1922.214 By asking the
Supreme Court to overrule its own precedent, he raised the threshold for his case
and laid the foundation for the Yankees’ argument that Federal Baseball had been
an exceptional ruling because it recognized baseball’s unique characteristics and
needs.215
3. The Yankees’ Argument
The Yankees relied heavily on these characteristics and needs, rejecting
Toolson’s argument that the broadening commerce clause ended baseball’s
exemption from antitrust scrutiny and asserting that the continued existence of
the exemption only emphasized baseball’s unique character.216 They argued that
because baseball clubs are “almost as interested in the financial success of the
others in the league as” in their own, applying the same rules to them as to
“commercial enterprises” would be an “absurdity.”217 Regarding baseball’s
continuing exemption from antitrust scrutiny, the Yankees had proof for one
baseball team’s interest in another team’s success: The Boston Red Sox had filed
an amicus brief supporting the Yankees’ assumption that Federal Baseball had been
a policy decision to create an antitrust exemption because of baseball’s unique

211 See supra Section I.A.3 (analyzing Pepper’s argument in Federal Baseball); see also infra
Section I.C.3 (analyzing the Yankees’ argument in Toolson).
212 Petitioner’s Opening Brief on Writ of Certiorari, supra note 209, at 35–37.
213 Id. at 47 (quoting Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J.,
concurring).
214 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 205, at 11–12.
215 See Nathanson, supra note 30, at 32–33.
216 Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 17, Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam) (No. 647).
217 Brief for Respondents at 24, Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)
(per curiam) (No. 18).
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character and that the teams had relied on this exemption since.218 Following
Pepper’s all-or-nothing approach in Federal Baseball,219 the Yankees argued that
the Supreme Court could either uphold the claimed exemption entirely or abolish
professional baseball along with the exemption, tertium non datur.220
Using Toolson’s secondary argument, the Yankees stressed the importance
of stare decisis, emphasizing the “large investments. . . made on the strength of
Mr. Justice Holmes’ opinion in the Federal Baseball Club case.”221 While this
would generally present a strong argument for the exemption, the Yankees
misrepresented, or misunderstood, the opinion in Federal Baseball. Justice Holmes
had not adopted Pepper’s argument regarding baseball’s unique characteristics
and needs.222 Likely by mistake, the Yankees based their brief on the importance
of stare decisis on a theory the Court had not actually adopted.223
The Yankees also framed baseball’s relation to the Sherman Act as a statutory
question.224 Federal Baseball notwithstanding, Congress had always held the power
to regulate professional baseball.225 Yet, because of baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs, only those laws that explicitly acknowledge baseball
apply to its business. Congressional silence since Federal Baseball showed that
Congress agreed to the exemption.226
The Yankees supported this argument by contrasting professional baseball to
the insurance industry.227 The Supreme Court had consistently upheld state laws
regulating insurances by finding that the insurance business, like that of baseball,
does not constitute commerce.228 However, the Court in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association229 found that “legal formulae devised to uphold

218 Brief for Boston Am. League Base Ball Co. as Amicus Curiae at 2, Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam) (No. 18).
219 See supra Section I.A.3 (analyzing Pepper’s arguments).
220 Brief for Respondents, supra note 216, at 66.
221 Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 215, at 30
(quoting Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951)).
222 See supra Section I.A.4.
223 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 37. But see infra Part I.C.4 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Toolson and its impact on the legal character of the baseball antitrust exemption).
224 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 216, at 63.
225 Id.
226 Cf. Brief for Respondents, supra note 216, at 66 (If “Congress . . . enact[s] such regulatory
measures as it believes necessary for the preservation of the game and the protection of the
public interest,” no congressional action regarding the exemption since Federal Baseball means
Congress believes no regulatory adjustment necessary, i.e., Congress agrees to the existing
exemption).
227 Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 215, at 17.
228 See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1913); Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1895); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869); Larry D. Carlson,
Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1127, 1129 n.16 (1979) (analyzing
how the Commerce Clause restricts state jurisdiction over the insurance business).
229 United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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state power cannot uncritically be accepted as trustworthy guides to determine
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.”230 Hence, it held insurances
subject to the Sherman Act.231
The Yankees argued that South-Eastern Underwriters would not apply to
baseball, though, because the decision was based on the character of insurance
that is “essential to all modern business” whereas professional baseball “contains
no element of either trade or commerce.”232 They contended that the Supreme
Court should uphold Federal Baseball because the decision remained unaffected
by any subsequent Supreme Court rulings,233 and the factual differences from
1922 did not change the fact that “a baseball game is inherently local in
character.”234 The Yankees concluded that Federal Baseball was correctly decided
and that only Congress should make changes to the baseball antitrust
exemption.235
4. The Opinion of the Court
Toolson is the most complex case in the baseball trilogy, even though the Court
only issued a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. In Federal Baseball, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had no jurisdiction over professional baseball because
the business of baseball did not constitute interstate commerce under the Court’s
definition in 1922.236 The Toolson Court interpreted this as holding that “the
business of providing public baseball games . . . was not within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws.”237 Notably, the Court adopted the Yankees’ argument that
congressional inaction on the exemption equated to congressional approval of
the exemption.238 The Court went on to say that by not acting upon the
exemption, Congress had allowed professional baseball’s business organizations
to disregard antitrust laws for thirty years.239 In Toolson, the Court then contrasted
the prospective effects of legislation with the retroactive effects of adjudication
to find that only Congress should revoke the baseball antitrust exemption.240 The
Court concluded by affirming the lower court opinions on the “authority of

Id. at 545.
Id. at 553-62.
232 Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 215, at 17.
233 See id. at 20-24 (analyzing the impact of post-Federal Baseball rulings on the relationship
between Organized Baseball and the Sherman Act).
234 Id. at 26.
235 Brief for Respondents, supra note 216, at 84.
236 See supra Section I.A.4.
237 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
230
231
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Federal Baseball . . . so far as that decision determines that Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal
antitrust laws.”241
The existing literature is divided in its assessment of Toolson’s majority
opinion. A “narrow” approach accepts the Toolson Court’s claim to uphold Federal
Baseball without any changes.242 This view sees Toolson as only “reaffirm[ing]
baseball’s antitrust exemption” as created in Federal Baseball.243 Thus, it considers
Toolson of little legal value.244 The predominant view recognizes divergences
between what the Toolson Court purported to hold and what it effectively held.
This view contests any intentional structure behind the Toolson opinion and
maintains that the Court’s misinterpretation of Federal Baseball caused the
divergences.245 It considers the reasoning in Toolson ahistorical and claims that
the Court “looked backwards at the opinion from its 1953 perch and substituted
the prevailing contemporary interpretation of the case for the [original]
interpretation.”246 A considerable number of analyses following this approach
derive Toolson’s structure from its opening, stating that the Supreme Court
intended to respect congressional inaction and avoid a retroactive application of
the Sherman Act to Organized Baseball.247 A complimentary view argues that
the closing statement in Toolson changed the meaning of Federal Baseball as part
of “the greatest bait-and-switch scheme in the history of the Supreme Court.”248
a. Federal Baseball and Congressional Intent
Toolson rests on two assertions regarding congressional intent. First, the
Supreme Court notes that “Congress has had the [Federal Baseball] ruling under
Id. (internal citation omitted).
See Walter T. Champion, Jr., “Mixed Metaphors,” Revisionist History and Post-Hypnotic
Suggestions on the Interpretation of Sports Antitrust Exemptions: The Second Circuit’s Use in Clarett of a
Piazza-like “Innovative Reinterpretation of Supreme Court Dogma,” 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 55, 63
(2009); Murphy, supra note 44, at 808.
243 John Tehranian, It’ll Break Your Heart Every Time: Race, Romanticism and the Struggle for Civil
Rights in Litigating Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 947, 961 n.73.
244 See, e.g., id., makes only five passing remarks to Toolson in its analysis of the exemption.
245 See, e.g., Nathanson, supra note 30, at 40 (finding Toolson a “misreading of Federal Baseball”
that approved the revisionist view); David L. Snyder, Anatomy of an Aberration: An Examination
of the Attempts to Apply Antitrust Law to Major League Baseball through Flood v. Kuhn (1972), 4
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 192 (2008) (finding that “Toolson completely
misapplied the precedent of Federal Baseball”).
246 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 41.
247 E.g., BANNER, supra note 18, at 121–22 (arguing that before Toolson, the Court had waited
for Congress to act and vice versa, and that the retroactive effect prevented a more decisive
ruling); see also D. Logan Kutcher, Note, Overcoming an “Aberration”: San Jose Challenges Major
League Baseball’s Longstanding Antitrust Exemption, 40 J. CORP. L. 233, 251–52 (2014)
(summarizing Toolson as based on congressional silence and retroactivity concerns); Philip R.
Bautista, Note, Congress Says, “Yooou’re Out!!!” to the Antitrust Exemption of Professional Baseball: A
Discussion of the Current State of Player-Owner Collective Bargaining and the Impact of the Curt Flood Act
of 1998, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 445, 451 (2000) (same).
248 McDonald, supra note 31, at 100—01.
241
242
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consideration . . . for thirty years” without subjecting professional baseball to
antitrust scrutiny.249 Second, “Congress had no intention of including the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”250
The Supreme Court could only draw conclusions from congressional inaction
if the Court had been aware that Congress knowingly had jurisdiction over the
matter. If Congress had been unaware of baseball’s antitrust exemption, the
Court could not have construed congressional inaction as intent. Unless
Congress also knew about its jurisdiction over professional baseball, inaction
might only result from constitutional concerns. For some time after Federal
Baseball, Congress had presumed jurisdiction over professional baseball but
perceived an exemption as nonexistent.251 However, when the 82nd Congress
House Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power considered exempting
professional sports from antitrust scrutiny, its members were aware of Federal
Baseball.252 Additionally, even Toolson conceded congressional knowledge of the
exemption.253
According to the original interpretation, however, Federal Baseball was a
constitutional decision.254 Therefore, congressional jurisdiction over professional
baseball required either Federal Baseball’s obsoletion or adoption of the revisionist
interpretation. Sixty-six years after Toolson, legal commentators remain divided
on the correct interpretation of Federal Baseball.255 Before Toolson, Congress had
no reason to believe the Court would adopt the revisionist interpretation.
Despite the economic and societal changes following 1922,256 the Gardella case
and its scholarly interpretation displays a general confusion over Federal Baseball’s
obsoletion in 1953.257 Hence, Congress had no reason to presume jurisdiction
over professional baseball pre-Toolson. Knowing that Congress could not act, the
Court could not deduce from the fact that Congress did not act that Congress did
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam).
Id.
251 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 41; see also supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text
(analyzing congressional consideration of the matter during the Great Depression).
252 BANNER, supra note 18, at 120 n.57.
253 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 205 and accompanying text.
254 See supra Section I.A.4.
255 Compare Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, 567–69 (finding that Federal Baseball held
professional baseball outside federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Commerce Clause) and
Nathanson, supra note 30, at 20 (same) with Ham, supra note 22, at 213 (finding that Federal
Baseball “virtually exempted” professional baseball from federal antitrust scrutiny) and Haber,
supra note 15, at 7 (finding that Federal Baseball created the exemption).
256 See supra Section I.B. (analyzing how these changes led to the expectation that Toolson
would overrule Federal Baseball).
257 See supra Section I.B.2. (analyzing Gardella and its reception in the literature).
249
250
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not want to act. Moreover, congressional silence does not affect the Supreme
Court’s power to overrule its own precedent.258 Therefore, congressional silence
here did not obligate the Court to uphold the exemption.
The second assertion relies on Federal Baseball holding that Congress had no
intention of placing baseball under the Sherman Act in 1890.259 “As an empirical,
historical matter,” the idea that Congress considered baseball at all when enacting
the Sherman Act “was almost certainly wrong.”260 Accordingly, the Federal
Baseball Court did not consider congressional intent.261 The facts support neither
of the Toolson Court’s assertions regarding congressional intent.
b. Narrow Interpretation
The narrow approach ignores the discrepancies between the facts and what
the Court presents as facts. It originates in the ruling from Piazza v. Major League
Baseball262 that considers Toolson as simply upholding Federal Baseball.263 The
narrow approach highlights the Supreme Court’s subsequent definition of Toolson
as “a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis.”264 A literal interpretation of
Toolson in this context suggests that Toolson upheld Federal Baseball narrowly, that
is, without any alterations.265 However, interpreting Toolson as narrowly fitted on
Federal Baseball’s precedent oversimplifies Toolson’s structure.266 Toolson was a
narrow case of stare decisis only in that its closing statement upheld Federal
Baseball,267 that is, “only insofar as it reinterpreted Federal Baseball into a statement

258 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121–22 (1940) (holding that the Supreme “Court . . .
has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction. . . . [b]y imputing to
Congress a hypothetical recognition[,] . . . we cannot evade our own responsibility for
reconsidering, in the light of further experience, the validity of distinctions which this Court
has itself created); see also Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–70 (1946) (citing Hallock
that congressional silence does not bar the Court from overruling precedent); see generally State
Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997) (emphasizing the diminutive role of precedent in
antitrust cases); but see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972) (considering “positive
inaction” different from “mere congressional silence and passivity”).
259 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 570.
260 BANNER, supra note 18, at 120; accord McDonald, supra note 31, at 101; see also Toolson, 346
U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Congress . . . has enacted no express
exemption of organized baseball from the Sherman Act”).
261 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 571; see supra Section I.A.4. (finding no
reference to congressional intent in Federal Baseball).
262 Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see generally infra
Section II.A.1. (analyzing Piazza).
263 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 276 (1972)).
264 Flood, 407 U.S. at 275–76 (quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228–30 (1955))
(first emphasis added).
265 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436; Champion, supra note 241, at 63; see infra Section II.A.2.
(analyzing the reasoning in Piazza).
266 See infra Section I.C.4.d (showing the complex structure behind Toolson).
267 Flood, 407 U.S. at 275–76 (quoting Shubert, 348 U.S. at 228–30).
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of Congressional intent.”268 Toolson did not uphold Federal Baseball narrowly, but
rather, only a narrow part of Toolson upheld Federal Baseball. The narrow approach
violates the Supreme Court precedent in Toolson.
c. Formalist Interpretation
Had Toolson actually relied on the facts stated therein, the ruling would have
abrogated Federal Baseball. Since Congress did not consider professional baseball
in 1890, and Federal Baseball did not acknowledge congressional intent, Toolson
would have eliminated the scope of Federal Baseball. A contemporary analyst
similarly concludes, “Toolson would then seem to reaffirm nothing.”269
The predominant view attributes any discrepancy between Federal Baseball and
Toolson’s interpretation of it to the Supreme Court’s perceived incompetence.270
It claims the Toolson Court could not recognize the different perspective of Federal
Baseball. Consequently, some commentators have claimed that the Toolson Court
substituted its own viewpoint and misinterpreted the earlier case.271 Toolson’s
instrumentalist approach does not rely on empirical facts,272 and its justifications
for upholding the antitrust exemption from Federal Baseball actually modifies that
case, creating the exact kind of exemption necessary for the Court’s intentions
in Toolson. Conversely, “[f]ormalists infer the doctrine from . . . empirical
evidence.”273 They “rely on the facts as recorded by the judge” and otherwise
“ignore fact-finding, treating it as uncontroversial.”274 Because formalists
acknowledge that judges are “fallible at discerning the doctrine,” they “treat cases
of ‘first impression’ (where no previous precedent exists) with caution.”275
Furthermore, they acknowledge that doctrine is not absolute but relative to a
certain time and place and affected by economic and societal changes. 276
Considering that Federal Baseball was a case of first impression, removed from

Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 597.
Professional Football Immune from Sherman Act as a Team Sport not Constituting
Interstate Commerce, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 110, 112–13 n.24 (1956).
270 See sources cited supra note 257.
271 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 40–41.
272 See infra Section II.C.4.d.
273 Paul Troop, Why Legal Formalism is not a Stupid Thing, 31 RATIO JURIS 428, 431 (2018); see
generally Steven M. Quevedo, Comment, Formalist and Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning and Legal
Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 119 (1985) (comparing legal formalism, instrumentalism, and
realism).
274 Id. at 432.
275 Id. at 430.
276 Id. at 429–30.
268
269
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Toolson not just by three decades but by the advent of radio and television, the
Great Depression, and the New Deal,277 formalists would likely have favored
overruling the elder decision. Because formalists rely on the judge to impartially
provide the facts, proponents of the ahistorical view cannot fathom that Justice
Black deliberately misrepresented the facts in Toolson when he claimed that
Congress had considered professional baseball when enacting the Sherman Act.
Their perspective prohibits considering a controversial fact-finding process
anything but flawed lawmaking and a “misreading.”278 Notably, the dominant
view contends that Toolson “made sense only if one ignored the realities and
circumstances surrounding Federal Baseball.”279 Since “[f]ormalists assume that
the doctrine is complete in that there is always a right answer to the question of
how a judge will respond to a particular factual scenario,”280 they can
comprehend the peculiar reasoning in Toolson only by attributing the Court’s
opinion to invalid doctrinal framework.281 They cannot correctly assess the
opinion in Toolson and fail to even perceive the different perspectives. Toolson did
not, as some claim, “declare[] the revisionists the victor in the battle over the
meaning of Federal Baseball,”282 but used the general acceptance and overall
structure of that interpretation to further its own goals. The Supreme Court did
not adopt a revisionist interpretation because the Justices could not recall the
original meaning of Federal Baseball but because it provided the most efficient way
towards the Court’s objective in Toolson.283
Therefore, the Court not only subjected professional baseball to
congressional jurisdiction but also created the baseball antitrust exemption.
When the Supreme Court claimed congressional inaction was a reason to uphold
baseball’s exemption, it implied that Congress had jurisdiction over professional
baseball. By holding that the exemption originated in congressional intention to
exempt baseball from the Sherman Act, the closing statement in Toolson Court
found that baseball had been within congressional reach even before Federal
Baseball.284 Thus, both parts of Toolson individually extended congressional
jurisdiction over the business of baseball. Because Congress cannot overrule
constitutional decisions, the Court implicitly based the baseball exemption on a
policy decision by putting it within congressional reach.

See supra Section I.B.1. (analyzing the socioeconomic changes between 1922 and 1953).
Nathanson, supra note 30, at 40 (referring to Toolson’s interpretation of Federal Baseball).
279 Id.
280 Troop, supra note 272, at 429.
281 See Nathanson, supra note 30, at 41 (finding that the Toolson Court wrongly employed the
1953 interpretation of Federal Baseball instead of that from 1922).
282 Id.
283 See infra Section II.C.4.d.
284 See infra note 259.
277
278
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d. Instrumentalist Interpretation
Formalist commentators contend that the above arguments comprise the
entire impact of Toolson.285 Yet, an opinion that accepts that Toolson implicitly
changed the law cannot logically reject the change that inevitably follows.
Because the Court had exempted baseball from federal antitrust laws, the
underlying policy decision was a statutory interpretation of the Sherman Act. If
baseball’s antitrust exemption was based on an interpretation of the Sherman
Act, the business of baseball must otherwise be subject to that Act. Pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, only interstate commerce is subject to the Sherman Act.
Hence, Toolson implicitly acknowledges the character of the business of baseball
as interstate commerce. In addition, the Toolson Court had held Federal Baseball to
find that “Congress had no intention” to extend federal antitrust scrutiny over
professional baseball.286 Effectively, this requires that the 51st Congress had the
intention to not include baseball under the Sherman Act in 1890.287 This
hypothetical intention requires at least an abstract justification. One such
justification was baseball’s unique characteristics and needs for an antitrust
exemption—an idea that was first introduced by Pepper in Federal Baseball.288
Thus, Toolson implicitly accepted baseball’s unique characteristics and needs as
the rationale for upholding an exemption.
Understanding Toolson’s system of interdependent implications requires
acknowledgment of the Warren Court’s instrumentalist approach.289 Any
fundamental critique of that approach notwithstanding, “this remarkable Court”
used the law as a means to an end.290 The Toolson majority resorted to the baitand-switch scheme not because of a gross misinterpretation of Federal Baseball,
but because the justices fully appreciated the earlier case and adjusted the opinion
according to their instrumentalist views. Soon afterwards, the same Court would
issue a no less controversial opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.291 These rulings

E.g., Nathanson, supra note 30, at 40–41.
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
287 See McDonald, supra note 31, at 101 (insinuating the Toolson Court assumed such
congressional intent in 1890).
288 See supra Sections I.A.3., I.C.3. (analyzing the respective defendants’ arguments in Federal
Baseball and Toolson).
289 See BANNER, supra note 18, at 122; Robert Henry, The Players and the Play, in THE BURGER
COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? 13 (Bernard Schwartz, ed.,1998).
290 Henry, supra note 288, at 13–14.
291 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Robert G. McCloskey & Sanford
Levinson, The Modern Court and Postwar America: 1937–1959, in ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 120, 144 (2016) (calling the reaction to Brown in the South “noisy
and stubborn”).
285
286
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appear to be unrelated, for Flood upheld the precedent and left the matter to
legislation, whereas Brown overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,292 deciding the matter
through judicial rulemaking.293 Yet, the Brown Court ignored concerns in fact and
law to further its policy goals.294 In the same way the Toolson opinion is
subordinate to its ends, Brown overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine not
“in form” but because of the increasing importance of public education.295
Eventually, in Miranda v. Arizona,296 the Warren Court famously required police
to inform a suspect in their custody of his rights.297 As Toolson changed the
character of Federal Baseball to a decision about congressional intent,298 the ruling
in Dickerson v. United States299 shows that the character of Miranda remains
debatable.300 Instrumentalists might question if a ruling that entirely changes
what it claims to uphold is “[i]ntellectually honest.”301 Yet, Toolson was neither
the only nor the last example of “a radical revision of the most significant element
of” an earlier case found in an opinion purportedly reaffirming said case.302 Like
Brown after it, Toolson adjusted the facts to fit its policy goals. Like Dickerson would
eventually change the character of Miranda, Toolson changed the character of
Federal Baseball over policy concerns. Thus, Toolson was an “early example[] of the
pragmatic, instrumentalist nature of the Warren Court, a willingness to justify
decisions on explicit policy grounds.”303
The reason the Toolson Court engaged in its long-winded, albeit, creative,
“bait-and-switch scheme”304 was the different effects of legislative and judicial
rulemaking.305 Legislative rulemaking has a prospective effect, whereas the
effects of judicial rulemaking are retroactive.306 Because “[j]udicial decisions have

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
See BANNER, supra note 18, at 122.
294 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32–
33 (1959).
295 Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 488.
296 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
297 Id..
298 See supra Section I.C.4.b.
299 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
300 Compare id. at 432 (“Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in
effect overruled by an Act of Congress”); with id. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Supreme
Court precedent showing “that Miranda is not required by the Constitution”); and id. at 445
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting that justices in the majority had earlier acknowledged “that
a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution”).
301 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 571.
302 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (presenting the Dickerson opinion as a
later example of this phenomenon).
303 BANNER, supra note 18, at 122.
304 McDonald, supra note 31, at 100.
305 BANNER, supra note 18, at 121–22.
306 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
292
293
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had retrospective operation for near a thousand years,”307 the Supreme Court
ostensibly had three options when ruling on Toolson. The ruling most beneficial
to professional baseball players would have been to overrule Federal Baseball and
retrospectively subject Organized Baseball to antitrust laws. Following this path,
the Court would have allowed thousands of players to sue under the Sherman
Act for threefold the damages received from not being able to negotiate their
salaries, thereby potentially ruining Organized Baseball.308 Organized Baseball
would have benefited most if Toolson upheld Federal Baseball in spite of any
economic and societal shifts between 1922 and 1953. The Supreme Court would
have effectively created a perpetual exemption. This decision would have held
that the advent of radio and television, combined with the Depression-era
extension of federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Commerce Clause, was
insufficient to affect the intrastate character of the business of baseball. Only
socioeconomic changes with even further reaching consequences could have
extended congressional reach over the business of baseball. Following this logic,
the only other option would be for the Supreme Court to submit baseball to
antitrust scrutiny, imperiling the game by retroactively revoking the entire
exemption. An intermediary position would have found Federal Baseball obsolete.
The Court could have ended the exemption before ever creating it. Toolson would
have granted professional baseball players an antitrust exemption for the future
and protected Organized Baseball from ruinous claims based in the past. The
justices considered the reserve system and actions that had been lawful at the
time similarly unfair but aimed to remove the Court as the power responsible.309
Based on these considerations, the first two options would have yielded
unsatisfactory results.
Despite this, the Supreme Court chose not the intermediate option but the
bait-and-switch scheme, which only provided the desired results through a series
of abstract and interwoven implications. Adopting the Yankees’ claim that
professional baseball could either be exempt from federal antitrust laws entirely
or would cease to exist in its current form,310 formalists assert that the Supreme
Court found itself between the Scylla of terminating professional baseball and
the Charybdis of perpetuating the antitrust exemption.311 Because this view
denies the Toolson Court really knew the original meaning of Federal Baseball, it
claims that the Court was unaware of the third option, and thus, that the baitKuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
BANNER, supra note 18, at 121–22.
309 Id. at 122.
310 See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text (analyzing that argument).
311 See BANNER, supra note 18, at 121–22 (comparing only the reserve system to retroactive
antitrust liability).
307
308
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and-switch scheme was nothing but an act of desperation by a Supreme Court
incapable of understanding its own precedent.
A desperate and inept Supreme Court would certainly support the narrative
of a crude and accidental antitrust exemption.312 Yet, that thesis finds no stronger
support in the facts than Congress considering baseball in 1890. Rather, Chief
Justice Warren urged Justice Black to add the closing statement because the
justices were employing the initial interpretation of Federal Baseball, that the
business of baseball was not interstate commerce.313 Since federal jurisdiction
pursuant to the Commerce Clause is limited to interstate commerce, the Court
could not have extended congressional jurisdiction over the existing antitrust
exemption.314 While Justice Black considered any distinction between baseball in
1922 and in 1953 unrealistic, the predominant point of agreement among the
justices was that Congress should have jurisdiction over Organized Baseball and
decide when to subject its business practices to the Sherman Act.315 Thus, the
Court intended to not only enable Congress to regulate the business of baseball,
but also to leave the extent this business should become subject to the antitrust
laws to congressional discretion. However, even the intermediate option would
have extended federal antitrust scrutiny over professional baseball from the
moment the Court issued its opinion, as Supreme Court rulings apply from the
moment the Court issues them.
The archives show that Justice Black only added the closing statement to
Toolson on the insistence of Chief Justice Warren to make abundantly clear that
Congress had jurisdiction over the business of baseball.316 This requires that the
antitrust exemption originate from a policy decision. That, in turn, was only
possible if Congress had always meant to exclude professional baseball from
federal antitrust scrutiny. Therefore, the ruling in Toolson was not conditional on
Federal Baseball determining Congress had acknowledged professional baseball
when enacting the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court was not demonstrating any
lack of historical understanding in Toolson.317 Rather, the Toolson Court extended
congressional jurisdiction over Organized Baseball by use of the legal fiction that
Congress considered baseball in 1890 and that Federal Baseball recognized these

312 See, e.g., Nathanson, supra note 30, at 40 (finding Toolson “an opinion that made sense only
if one ignored the realities and circumstances surrounding Federal Baseball”); see also id. at 44
(finding the Flood Court “entwined in the suppositions and assumptions surrounding Federal
Baseball” and that opinion “muddled . . . by the Court’s confusion over the nature and scope
of its own precedent”); see also McDonald, supra note 31, at 122 (finding Toolson and Flood
“wrongly decided” and their respective final sentences “equally . . . unrooted in the words of
Federal Baseball”).
313 BANNER, supra note 18, at 119.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 118–19.
316 Id. at 119.
317 But see McDonald, supra note 31, at 101 (implying the Toolson Court intentionally
disregarded the legislative history behind the Sherman Act).
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considerations, making a policy-decision thereupon. Because the majority
opinion did not rely on the true facts but presented as fact that which would
further its goals, Organized Baseball could not have deceived the justices in any
meaningful way. Based on Chief Justice Warren’s insistence, the intention of the
closing statement was to “send[] a message to Congress that it had the power to
subject baseball to the antitrust laws.”318 The entire opinion looked to serve this
goal. Because of the instrumentalist character of the Warren Court,319 “no
internal limitation . . . would require the law to conform to objective reality.”320
This instrumentalist view explains the Court’s apparently illogical reliance on
congressional inaction. After Toolson created the fiction that Congress had
enjoyed jurisdiction over Organized Baseball since 1890, the Court could
attribute congressional inaction to intent. If Congress had created the antitrust
exemption, legislative inaction on the issues would indeed imply congressional
consent. By holding that the baseball antitrust exemption was not obsolete, but
that Congress always had jurisdiction over the matter, the Court removed any
possible uncertainties that affected congressional decision-making between
Federal Baseball and Toolson.321 Toolson’s entire structure is adjusted to further the
Supreme Court’s objective of submitting the baseball antitrust exemption to
congressional discretion. Contrafactual claims do not reflect the Supreme Court’s
ignorance of historic events, but instead allow the exemption to best support the
Court’s intention. The Toolson Court thus brought Organized Baseball into
congressional jurisdiction but not into the scope of the Sherman Act, because “if
there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust
laws it should be by legislation.”322
D. FLOOD V. KUHN

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court faced the “evils in this field” once more
when it ruled on Flood v. Kuhn,323 the final case in the baseball trilogy. Flood was
the sole post-Toolson Supreme Court decision on the relationship between
baseball and antitrust laws, but was not the last on the baseball antitrust
exemption. Just two years after Toolson, the Court refused to relieve a theater

BANNER, supra note 18, at 121.
See sources cited supra note 289.
320 Matthew S. Akers, Unmoored from Its Foundation, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 339, 345 (2007)
(reviewing BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
(2006)).
321 BANNER, supra note 18, at 121.
322 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam).
323 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
318
319
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company from antitrust scrutiny in United States v. Shubert.324 The Shubert Court
held that Federal Baseball exempted “the business of baseball and nothing else”
from the Sherman Act.325 That same year, the Supreme Court held professional
boxing subject to federal antitrust scrutiny when it ruled on United States v.
International Boxing Club.326 Two years after that, the Court ruled in Radovich v.
National Football League on the relationship between professional football and
federal antitrust laws.327 Instead of applying baseball’s exemption to another
team sport, the Court limited Toolson and Federal Baseball to “the facts there
involved, i.e., the business of organized professional baseball.”328 Fourteen years
later and six years before Flood, the Supreme Court similarly refused to extend
the antitrust exemption to professional basketball in Haywood v. National
Basketball Association.329 In Flood, the Court consolidated these rulings with Toolson
and expressly laid out the baseball antitrust exemption’s scope.330
1. Facts
The Flood case originated in 1969 when the St. Louis Cardinals traded their
center fielder Curt Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies without his prior knowledge
or consent.331 In addition to its legal impact, the case was of significant cultural
importance.332 Flood was an All-Star player close to the peak of his career,
drawing more attention to his case than the “the earlier antitrust challenges,
which had been brought by obscure players and by a moribund team in a defunct
league.”333 Before the lawsuit, Flood was known as one of the best outfielders of
the 1960s. He had won the Gold Glove as one of the National League’s three
best defensive outfielders every year between 1963 and 1969 and had led in
putouts in four of those years.334 Nevertheless, at the end of the 1969 season,
Flood was sold in a deal between the St. Louis Cardinals and the Philadelphia
Phillies involving six other players.335 Unlike the others, he refused to play for

United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
Id. at 228.
326 United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
327 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
328 Id. at 451.
329 Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
330 See infra Section I.D.4.
331 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 264-655 (1972).
332 See BANNER, supra note 18, at 187–91 (showing how Flood reflects race and labor relations
and the generation gap of the 1960s); Tehranian, supra note 242, at 954 (finding that Flood
“both reflected and touched upon the broader civil rights struggle of the time”); see generally
James R. Devine, Curt Flood and the Triumph of the Show Me Spirit, 77 MO. L. REV. 9 (2012)
(analyzing the facts that led to Flood and its cultural impact).
333 BANNER, supra note 18, at 187.
334 Id. at 188.
335 Id. at 189.
324
325
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his new team. After an unsuccessful plea to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn to grant
him free agency, Flood filed suit.336 With Federal Baseball and Toolson in mind,
Flood anticipated losses at the lower courts as necessary to argue his case in front
of the Supreme Court.337 His presumptions proved right, and the lower courts
ruled in favor of Organized Baseball as represented by Commissioner Kuhn, but
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.338
2. Flood’s Argument
In his brief, Flood stressed the original meaning of Federal Baseball. He argued
that the Court had not held baseball exempt from antitrust scrutiny because of
its unique character, but because in 1922 personal effort did not constitute
commerce, and transportation across state borders was in itself insufficient to
make an activity interstate.339 Addressing the argument from Toolson that
congressional inactivity signaled approval, Flood contended that the Supreme
Court had “quickly stripped Federal Baseball Club of precedential force, removing
the impetus for legislative tinkering with the Sherman Act.”340 He claimed that
by implementing a draft system, the MLB had made the reserve system
“drastically more severe.”341 At the times of Federal Baseball and Toolson, baseball
players submitted to the reserve system by freely negotiating their first contract.
Under the post-1965 draft system, players were bound to the team that drafted
them.342 By prohibiting baseball players from freely negotiating even their entry
into the reserve system, Flood argued, Organized Baseball had “substantially
diminished whatever precedential value Toolson had.”343
3. Kuhn’s Argument
Contrariwise, Kuhn’s brief stressed how stare decisis compelled the Supreme
Court to uphold the exemption.344 He supported this argument by citing the
Court’s precedent in Radovich that “‘more harm would be done in overruling’”
the prior decisions than in adhering to them.345 Kuhn also claimed that Federal
Baseball was based on “the unique characteristics and needs of professional

336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345

Id. at 189–90.
Id. at 192.
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 258 (1972).
Brief for Petitioner at 19, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Brief for Respondents at 1–2, 21, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
Id. at 28 (citing Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1957)).
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baseball.”346 He argued that “Federal Baseball and Toolson have provided baseball
clubs with a clear guide for conduct for decades.”347 Continuing congressional
silence indicated “affirmative support” for the baseball antitrust exemption,
which “was plainly intended to stand unless and until disturbed by Congress.”348
4. The Opinion of the Court
Again, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Organized Baseball and upheld
the exemption.349 When Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, he
displayed a certain fondness for the game. In fact, he might have revealed a slight
bias against Flood and any ruling that would put professional baseball in peril.350
The presentation of Flood in Part II, entitled “The Petitioner,” barely exceeds
two pages but spends extensive space accentuating his considerable salaries.351 It
only concedes in a footnote that Flood had the support of the MLBPA.352 By
contrast, Part I, “The Game,” is a roughly four-page-long ode to baseball.353 It
includes a list of eighty-eight baseball players, “celebrated for one reason or
another, that have sparked the diamond and its environs and that have provided
tinder for recaptured thrills, for reminiscence and comparisons, and for
conversation and anticipation in-season and off-season,”354 and ends with
excerpts from poems on the “national pastime,”355 or, quoting George Bernard
Shaw, “the great American tragedy.”356
In spite of his fervent support for the game of baseball, Justice Blackmun
considered its exemption one of the Supreme Court’s great tragedies and an
“aberration.”357 He based this assessment on a comprehensive review of
Supreme Court precedent.358 Despite the exemption’s “inconsistency and
illogic,” he found the Court bound to the precedent of Federal Baseball and

Id. at 24.
Id. at 30.
348 Id. at 32–33.
349 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972).
350 Compare id. at 260-64 (celebrating the game of baseball) with id. at 264-66 (characterizing
Flood through his significant salaries).
351 See id., at 264–66.
352 Id. at 265 n.7.
353 See id. at 260–64.
354 Id. at 262–63.
355 Id. at 263–64 & nn.4–5 (quoting the poems).
356 Id. at 264 n.6 (quoting George Bernard Shaw, THE SPORTING NEWS, May 27, 1943, at 15,
col. 4).
357 Id. at 282.
358 See id. at 269–81.
346
347
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Toolson.359 Justice Blackmun then outlined certain aspects of the baseball antitrust
exemption:
1. Professional Baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce.
2. With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust
laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an
anomaly. Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration
confined
to
baseball.
3. Even though others might regard this as “unrealistic,
inconsistent, or illogical, . . . [i]t is an aberration that has been
with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully
entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived
the Court’s expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests
on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics
and
needs.
4. Other professional sports operating interstate . . . are not so
exempt.
5. The advent of radio and television . . . has not occasioned an
overruling
of
Federal
Baseball
and
Toolson.
6. The Court has emphasized that since 1922 baseball, with full
and continuing congressional awareness, has been allowed to
develop and to expand unhindered by federal legislative action
. . . The Court, accordingly, has concluded that Congress as yet has
had no intention to subject baseball’s reserve system to the reach of
the antitrust statutes. This, obviously, has been deemed to be
something other than mere congressional silence and
passivity. . . .
7. The Court has expressed concerns about the confusion and
the retroactivity problems that inevitably would result with a
judicial overturning of Federal Baseball. It has voiced a preference
that if any change is to be made, it come by legislative action that,
by its nature, is only prospective in operation.
8. The Court noted in Radovich . . . that the slate with respect to
baseball is not clean. Indeed, it has not been clean for half a
century.
. . . We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and
almost two decades after Toolson, to overturn those cases
judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those
359

Id. at 284.
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decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference
and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove
them legislatively.360
Here, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged for the first time that
professional baseball is exempt from federal antitrust laws. What the Toolson
Court implicitly held,361 Flood explicitly stated: The business of baseball is
interstate commerce and therefore within congressional jurisdiction. However,
the antitrust exemption results from baseball’s unique characteristics and needs.
Consequently, it remains unaffected by economic and societal changes such as
“[t]he advent of radio and television”362 and the Court’s broader definition of
interstate commerce.363 Baseball’s exemption had existed for more than fifty
years and is protected by the principle of stare decisis. The Supreme Court would
not revoke the exemption because of continuing congressional approval through
“positive inaction,” which is “something other than mere congressional silence
and passivity.”364 Moreover, concerns about retroactivity prevented the Court
from modifying the exemption. Because of the prospective nature of legislative
action, the Court left changing or abolishing baseball’s exemption to
Congress.365In addition to explicitly stating what Toolson had only implied, Flood
acknowledged Supreme Court precedent beyond the baseball trilogy. Since
Shubert, the Court had held non-baseball entertainment subject to federal
antitrust scrutiny.366 In Radovich, the Court clarified that baseball’s exemption did
not apply to other professional sports.367 Thus, Flood clearly laid out the aspects
of the baseball antitrust exemption and consolidated the entire relevant
precedent. Justice Blackmun concluded the majority opinion in Flood by quoting
the closing statement in Toolson and affirming the judgment below on the
authority of Federal Baseball, “so far as that decision determines that Congress had
no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal
antitrust laws.”368

Id. at 282–84 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
See supra Section I.C.4.d.
362 See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283.
363 Cf. id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding that between Federal Baseball and Toolson,
“the whole concept of commerce ha[d] changed”).
364 See id. at 283.
365 Id.
366 See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
367 See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
368 Flood, 407 U.S. at 285 (quoting Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953)
(per curiam)).
360
361
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In spite of Justice Blackmun’s preference for Organized Baseball,369 one view
finds that Flood restricted the baseball antitrust exemption to its reserve system.370
Another view argues that only Flood created the exemption because this case made
law of what before was only perceived as law.371 A third opinion, which is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s stated intention since Toolson, namely, that only
Congress should further regulate the baseball antitrust exemption, dispute that
Flood has legal value. As Mitchell Nathanson highlights in his refutation, that view
perceives Flood as “little more than a useless appendage to the baseball trilogy . . .
and consider[s the case] to add little to what had already been said in Federal
Baseball and Toolson.”372 Similarly, some commentators consider Toolson and Flood
“the most frequently criticized example of excessively strict stare decisis for
statutory precedents.”373
a. Restriction to the Reserve System
The first view rests on three premises. First, the facts involved in Federal
Baseball and in Toolson were limited to the reserve system. Second, Flood reduced
the precedential value of its predecessors to their facts. Third, Flood only held the
reserve system exempt from antitrust scrutiny.374
Reading Federal Baseball in conjunction with the underlying decision from the
D.C. Circuit, the restrictive view finds that “[t]he gravamen of Federal Baseball’s
case was the alleged anticompetitive impact of what is known as the ‘reserve
clause.’”375 The facts in Federal Baseball were not limited to the reserve system,
however: The Terrapins had alleged several anticompetitive behaviors by
Organized Baseball. The Peace Agreement between Organized Baseball and the

369 Compare supra notes 352-55 and accompanying text (analyzing Justice Blackmun’s view
on baseball); with supra notes 318–19 and accompanying text (analyzing his view on Curt
Flood).
370 See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Joseph A. Kohm,
Jr., Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: It’s Going, Going … Gone!, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1231, 1240–41
(1996); Stephen F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 169,
184 (1994); see also infra Section II.A. (refuting the reasoning in Piazza and two subsequent
rulings that adopted this view).
371 Nathanson, supra note 30, at 44.
372 Id. at 43.
373 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1380 (1988);
accord Champion, supra note 241, at 55–56, 64.
374 Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
375 Id. at 434 (citing Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc.,
269 F. 681, 687–88 (D.C. Cir. 1920)).
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Federal teams, not the reserve system, was most central to their claim.376 In fact,
the Court’s opinion in Federal Baseball contains neither the phrase “reserve clause”
nor any other reference to the reserve system.377 The “Piazza . . . court concluded
that Federal Baseball was really just a reserve clause case, citing the opinion of the
lower court.”378 However, “the Supreme Court thought Federal Baseball dealt with
other issues over and above the reserve clause.”379 Even if the Court
incorporated the reserve system into its opinion as one of several anticompetitive
behaviors alleged by the Terrapins deemed “unnecessary to repeat,”380 that
system provided neither the sole nor the principle facts of the case.
As Justice Burton acknowledged in his dissent, behavior concerning the
reserve system was the disputed conduct in Toolson.381 Nevertheless, the majority
in Toolson decided “[w]ithout [any] re-examination of the underlying issue[].”382
Because the Court found the difference between the alleged anticompetitive
behaviors in Toolson and in Federal Baseball irrelevant, the deciding fact could only
be whether the conduct in question was part of the “business [of] . . . giving
exhibitions of base ball”;383 that is, “the business of providing public baseball
games.”384 Additionally, Toolson applies with equal force to its two companion
cases. Because the plaintiff in Corbett v. Chandler,385 one of those cases, also alleged
that Organized Baseball violated federal antitrust laws by monopolizing the
business of baseball,386 reserve system behavior was not the only conduct in
question in Toolson.387 Flood noted that the Radovich Court, citing Toolson and
Federal Baseball for support, “specifically limit[ed] the rule there established to
the facts there involved, i.e., the business of organized professional baseball,” not
just the reserve system.388
Nevertheless, even if the facts in Federal Baseball and Toolson were not limited
to the reserve system, Flood could have “stripped from Federal Baseball and Toolson
See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (analyzing the Terrapins’ allegations).
See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922); see also Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 599 (finding no reference to the
reserve clause in the majority opinion in Federal Baseball).
378 Major League Baseball v. Butterworth (Butterworth II), 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1324 n.9
(N.D. Fla. 2001).
379 Id.
380 Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207.
381 Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 362–64 (1953) (per curiam) (Burton, J.,
dissenting).
382 Id. at 357.
383 Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208.
384 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
385 Corbett v. Chandler, 345 U.S. 963 (1953) (mem.) (deciding companion antitrust case),
cert. granted, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953)(mem.).
386 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., dissenting).
387 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 599.
388 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972) (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1957)).
376
377
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any precedential value those cases may have had beyond the particular facts there
involved” like the Piazza court claimed.389 Piazza contrasts with Federal Baseball,
holding that the business of baseball is not interstate commerce, while Flood
found that “[p]rofessional baseball is a business . . . engaged in interstate
commerce.”390 Under the American legal system’s approach of “rule stare
decisis”, precedent binds the courts to uphold both the results and the rationale
of the preceding case.391 Flood “entirely undercut the precedential value of the
reasoning of Federal Baseball.”392 If Toolson depended on the reasoning in Federal
Baseball, Flood would have restricted the precedential value of both rulings to their
results, that is, the facts involved therein. Thus, Federal Baseball needs Toolson to
remain valid.393 Because Toolson implicitly acknowledged the business of baseball
as interstate commerce and modified the holding in Federal Baseball
accordingly,394 Flood could not affect their combined precedential value: Flood
restricts neither Federal Baseball nor Toolson.395
Hence, the restrictive view depends on Flood holding “that the . . . exemption
is limited to the reserve clause.”396 Unlike the earlier opinions, Flood “refers to
the reserve clause at least four times.”397 Yet, a purely numerical analysis provides
little legal information useful in resolving this dispute.398 Flood acknowledges a
broader scope of the baseball antitrust exemption at least six times.399 A
quantitative analysis suggests a broader antitrust exemption but is insufficient to
determine its scope.
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Id. at 435–36 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972)) (alteration in original).
391 Id. at 437–38.
392 Id. at 436.
393 Supra Section I.C.4.a.
394 Supra Section I.C.4.b.
395 See, e.g., Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d. 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003); Charles O.
Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir. 1978); see also Grow, Business of Baseball, supra
note 16, at 598–600 (arguing that the Piazza court erred by restricting Federal Baseball and
Toolson to the reserve system).
396 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436.
397 Id. at 437.
398 See Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 593 (“In fact, one could just as easily create
a list of passages from Flood that indicate that the exemption broadly applies to the business
of baseball.”).
399 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 274 (1972) (recognizing Toolson’s emphasis “that Congress
had no intention to include baseball within the reach of federal antitrust laws”); id. at 275
(quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228 (1955)); id. at 279 (“[W]e now specifically
limit the rule [Federal Baseball and Toolson] established to . . . the business of organized
professional baseball.”)(quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450–52
(1957)); id. at 283 (stating how the Court has concluded Congress has never shown an intention
389
390

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

43

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3

64

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 27:1

Therefore, the restricting interpretation quotes Flood that baseball’s “reserve
system enjoy[s] exemption from the federal antitrust laws.”400 Supposedly, this
means that only the reserve system enjoys antitrust exemption pursuant to Flood.
Yet, such an interpretation “read[s] too much into Flood’s few passing references
to baseball’s reserve system.”401 Because the facts in Flood originated in the
reserve system, that system is also the starting point for the majority opinion. 402
Still, it “was merely the incident-driven catalyst for the Court’s inquiry.”403 Flood
begins at the reserve system but concludes by citing Toolson and excluding “‘the
business of baseball’” from “‘the scope of the federal antitrust laws.’”404 The
Flood Court’s review of the relevant precedent finds Shubert “meticulously spelling
out”405 that “Federal Baseball . . . was dealing with the business of baseball.”406
Flood considers the reserve system merely one part of that business.407 Moreover,
the Court approvingly cited Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs,408 a case that involved the employment terms of umpires, not the reserve
system.409 Flood also cited State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.,410 a case involving
franchise relocation, as correctly applying the baseball exemption.411
b. Creating the Exemption
The second view acknowledges that Federal Baseball did not create an antitrust
exemption.412 Because the exemption “did not originate with Federal Baseball and
was not explicitly created within Toolson either,”413 this view holds that the Flood
Court exempted baseball from federal antitrust scrutiny.414 Yet, while Toolson
created no explicit antitrust exemption, the Court’s instrumentalist approach

of subjecting the reserve system to antitrust law); id. at 284 (explaining how consistency
demands a broad view of the exemption and that Congress, not the courts, should remedy this
view otherwise); id. at 285 (“Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball
within the scope of . . . federal antitrust laws.”) (quoting Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357).
400 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436 (quoting Flood, 407 U.S. at 282).
401 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 593.
402 See id.
403 New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc., No.
93-253, 1994 WL 631144, at *9 n.4 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994).
404 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (quoting Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357).
405 Id. at 275.
406 Id. (quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228 (1955)).
407 Id. (examining Shubert, 348 U.S. at 228).
408 Id. at 268 n.9 (citing Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005
(2d Cir. 1970)).
409 Salerno, 429 F.2d 1003.
410 State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966), overruled by Olstad v. Microsoft
Corp., 700 N.W.2d 139 (Wis. 2005).
411 Flood, 407 U.S. at 272 n.13, 284 n.21 (citing Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2.d 1).
412 See Nathanson, supra note 30, at 20.
413 Id. at 41.
414 See id. at 44 (considering Flood “a decision that did everything most people by then had
assumed Federal Baseball had already done”).
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allowed the creation of an implicit exemption.415 Since Flood could not establish
an exemption that already existed, the second interpretation is invalid.
c. Excessive Stare Decisis
The view that stresses the importance of stare decisis for Flood is correct in
that that the case brings few legal changes. Still, the existing variants ignore the
Supreme Court’s intentions after Toolson. Flood is not useless, as some
commentators have claimed, nor is the principle of stare decisis the entire reason
behind the majority opinion. Understanding Flood requires an acknowledgment
of the majority opinion’s position in the framework of the baseball trilogy and
the general context of the Burger Court.
Like the Warren Court before it, the Burger Court generally “misused
precedent, failed to develop a principle of law for neutral application, and failed
to provide guidance to lower courts when reaching the holding of the case.”416
Considering that the Court could not create an exemption in Flood that had
existed since Toolson, the opinion indeed appears to be useless. Yet, in Flood, the
Court expressed for the first time what it had previously only implicitly held and
provided the lower courts with guidance on the holding of Toolson. Since “[t]he
Supreme Court sets broad policy,”417 its guidelines are by nature more general
than lower courts’ opinions answering single questions. The Flood guidelines
allow the lower courts to delimit the baseball antitrust exemption’s scope.418
Even if the Flood Court did not develop a neutral principle of law, it did present
the precedent in the most neutral way possible. Toolson established the principle
that professional baseball is exempt from antitrust scrutiny. A peculiar principle,
as baseball’s exemption is as neutral as an exemption can be. An exemption for
all professional team sports would not have been less biased against professional
boxing. Exempting all professional sports from antitrust scrutiny would not be
neutral towards other forms of entertainment.419 Congressional modifications
notwithstanding,420 the exemption applies to the major and minor leagues and

See supra Section I.C.4. (analyzing the majority opinion in Toolson).
Erwin O. Switzer, Applying Criticisms of the Warren Court to the Burger Court: A Case Study of
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 203, 228 (1982).
417 Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why it Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219,
221 (2010).
418 See infra Part II (presenting the scope of the antitrust exemption as defined by the lower
courts).
419 See supra notes 323-28 and accompanying text (analyzing how the Supreme Court held a
theater company, professional boxing, professional football, and professional basketball
subject to antitrust scrutiny).
420 See infra notes 440–48 and accompanying text (analyzing how Congress limited the scope
of baseball’s exemption through the Curt Flood Act of 1998).
415
416
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all of their respective teams alike and provides a neutral principle within its
narrow scope.
Ostensibly, a systematic analysis of the Supreme Court’s unique position and
function in the legal system paints Flood as an example of excessively strict stare
decisis. The Court has acknowledged that stare decisis provides reliability and
stability that are of “fundamental importance to the rule of law.”421
Consequently, it considers its own prior decisions “entitled to deference or a
presumption of correctness.”422 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has the power
and occasionally the obligation to overrule its own precedent.423 Deciding Flood
exclusively by the principle of stare decisis would arguably have been excessive.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion in Flood, “was
hardly one to stick dogmatically to precedent.”424 Shortly after Flood, he authored
the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade and constituted a conditional “right of
personal privacy” that “includes . . . abortion.”425 Since Justice Blackmun had
been struggling with Roe for months, Flood presented “a welcome respite from
his troubles with the constitutional law of abortion.”426 Eventually, Justice
Blackmun would admit that Flood was his favorite opinion to write.427 Justice
Douglas may have considered the exemption “a derelict in the stream of the law”
and a “mistake[],”428 and Justice Marshall may have called the exemption an
“error” the Court must “correct.”429 Justice Blackmun, however, upheld the
exemption not because of a dogmatical adherence to the principle of stare
decisis, but out of fear “that if the antitrust laws were applied to baseball, its
unique position as the national pastime would be undermined.”430 While
baseball’s reserve system may have been akin to slavery,431 Justice Blackmun
found its antitrust exemption was not a necessary evil but, in fact, a positive good.

421 Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (citing Welch v.
Texas Dep’t of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987)).
422 Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 156 (2006).
423 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 292–93 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Stinson, supra
note 416, at 242–43; Kerlin’s Lessee v. Bull 1 U.S. 175, 178 (1786) (providing the courts with
discretion regarding the value of precedent); Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes:
Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U.L. REV. 1069, 1069–70 (2006)
(refuting Chief Justice Roberts’s analogy during his confirmation hearing that Justices had to
apply existing rules like baseball umpires).
424 Tehranian, supra note 242, at 963–64.
425 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
426 BANNER, supra note 18, at 216.
427 Id. at 211.
428 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286, 288 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
429 Id. at 292–93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
430 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
190 (1979).
431 See sources cited supra note 73
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Hence, he engaged with his list of famous baseball players rather than responding
to the dissents of other justices, who argued for its abolition.432
d. Doctrinal Changes
Justice Blackmun’s personal interest in baseball and its influence on the
majority opinion in Flood finds further evidence in a historical analysis of the
Supreme Court’s prospective doctrine. Until the 1960s, all court decisions had
retroactive effect.433 Consequently, the Toolson Court changed the character of
Federal Baseball instead of overruling the precedent in 1953.434 When, in 1965, the
Court ruled on Linkletter v. Walker,435 it created a balancing test that allowed
judicial rulemaking with prospective effect in matters of criminal law.436 In 1971,
when ruling on Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,437 the Court created a similar test for
civil law cases.438 While the Court would reinstate full retroactivity in 1987 for
decisions on criminal law,439 it refuses to apply the same reasoning to civil law
decisions.440 Because the justices have failed to agree upon a rationale against
prospective judicial lawmaking in civil law decisions,441 state courts retain that
power.442 Nevertheless, at least since 1993, when the Supreme Court ruled on
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,443 all federal rulings on civil cases have
retrospective effect.444 Thus, if the Supreme Court heard a case on the baseball
antitrust exemption, it would face the same retrospectivity concerns that the

See BANNER, supra note 18, at 210–11.
See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1055, 1059 (1997).
434 See supra Section I.C.4. (analyzing the Toolson opinion).
435 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
436 See id. at 629.
437 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
438 See id. at 106–07.
439 See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
440 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 197 (1990) (plurality opinion) (finding
“important distinctions between the retroactive application of civil and criminal decisions”).
441 Fisch, supra note 432, at 1062.
442 See Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgements in American Law, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. SUPP. 37, 41–45, 50 (2014).
443 Harper v. Va. Dept. of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
444 Id. at 97; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278–79 n.32 (1994) (finding
that Harper “established a firm rule of retroactivity”); see also Kay, supra note 441, at 50
(highlighting that prospective judicial lawmaking was only permissible for “state courts
applying state law”). But see Lee-Ford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive
Application of Obergefell, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 873, 917 (finding the Supreme Court to have
retroactively created federal rights in 2015).
432
433
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Toolson Court had to face in 1953 without the option to find baseball’s exemption
obsolete.445
As an aspect of electronic commerce (e-commerce), the MLB’s online
services contribute to the significant societal and economic changes of the
Internet era.446 Yet, the business of baseball does not change when fans watch a
game online or on television.447 Therefore, the Internet era did not affect the
character of the business of baseball and did not make the antitrust exemption
obsolete. The Supreme Court could neither have prospectively revoked the
exemption when it ruled on Toolson in 1953 nor would it have that power if it
granted certiorari on a case pertaining to the matter under the currently prevailing
doctrine.
However, when the Supreme Court ruled on Flood in 1972, it had the power,
at least hypothetically, to abolish the exemption without retrospective effect.
Under the test the Court had laid out in Huson, this would have required Flood to
first “establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent
. . . or by deciding an issue of first impression.”448 Second, the Court would have
had to “weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history
of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective
operation will further or retard its operation.”449 Finally, if a Supreme Court
decision “could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively,
there is ample basis . . . for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of
nonretroactivity.”450 By abolishing the baseball antitrust exemption, the Flood
Court would have overruled the clear precedent of Federal Baseball and Toolson
pursuant to the first factor. The MLB and its teams had, since 1922, also been
allowed “with full and continuing congressional awareness . . . to expand
unhindered by federal legislative action.”451 Prior to Flood, since the MLB could
at “most . . . rely on the law as it then was,” subjecting its teams retroactively to
the Sherman Act would have been “anomalous indeed.”452 “The purpose of
[that] Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to

445 See supra notes 304-08 and accompanying text (analyzing how a Court with only
retrospective rulemaking power could decide on an existing baseball antitrust exemption).
446 See Carlos A. Primo Braga, E-Commerce Regulation: New Game, New Rules?, 45 Q. REV.
ECON. & FIN. 541, 542 (2005) (analyzing the impact of e-commerce on the effects of the
“‘networking revolution’”).
447 Cf. Klinker, supra note 42, at 901–05 (comparing the MLB’s streaming service to its
broadcasting policy).
448 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (citations omitted).
449 Id. at 106–07 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)).
450 Id. at 107 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)).
451 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972). But see supra Section I.C.4. (arguing that the
MLB could rely on congressional inaction only since 1953).
452 Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107.
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protect the public from the failure of the market. . . . It does so not out of
solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the public interest.”453
Retroactive application of the Sherman Act to the MLB would have furthered
the private interests of baseball players but may have potentially deprived the
public of professional baseball games. Contrary to the Act’s purpose, it would
have caused the baseball market to fail.454 The second factor would also argue in
favor of abolishing the exemption prospectively. The retroactive effects would
finally be “substantial[ly] inequitable”455 by holding the MLB accountable for
violating obligations “at a time when [it] could not have known . . . that the law
imposed [them] upon [it].”456 Hence, the 1972 legal doctrine would have allowed
the Supreme Court to abolish the baseball antitrust exemption with prospective
effect.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall advocated for this approach,457 citing prior
instances of the Court overruling its earlier statutory interpretation with
prospective effect.458 Justice Blackmun’s reasons for avoiding the question of
whether the Flood Court could prospectively revoke the exemption by referring
to the Court’s earlier retroactivity concerns,459 namely, those in the pre-Huson
decisions in Toolson and Radovich,460 are lost to time. His obvious fondness for
professional baseball and his interest in upholding baseball’s exemption to
preserve the game’s unique status suggests he might have avoided the subject to
prevent other justices from acknowledging what Justice Marshall propounded.
From this viewpoint, Justice Blackmun’s decision not to engage with any dissent
directed his colleagues’ focus away from that option. Even if other justices,

453 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993); accord Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 491–93 (1940).
454 See supra note 197-98 and accompanying text (analyzing retroactive application of the
Sherman Act to Organized Baseball in 1953).
455 Huson, 404 U.S. at 108 (quoting Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 706).
456 Id.
457 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
458 Id. at 293, n.5 (quoting United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295 (1970))
(citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964)).
459 See id. at 283.
460 Id. at 273–74, 284 (citing Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953)); id.
at 278–79 (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1957)).
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including Chief Justice Burger, considered the ode to baseball obtrusive,461 it still
attracts attention among.462
Then again, “in the good old days, when retroactivity was simple,”463 Chief
Justice Hughes had already considered it “among the most difficult [questions]
of those which have engaged the attention of” the Court.464 Consequently, not
only had Justice Blackmun abstained from original retroactivity considerations
in the majority opinion, but Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas ignored the
issue entirely.465 Since Justice Blackmun had joined the Court just recently,466 he
might not have recognized the doctrinal changes between Toolson and Flood.
Writing the majority opinion might have simply allowed for intellectual
recreation from the demands of Roe and an opportunity to “play[] with baseball
cards.”467 From this viewpoint, Justice Blackmun simply overlooked Justice
Marshall’s single remark to prospective judicial rulemaking.
Both explanations—the young justice outwitting his colleagues to preserve
his beloved game or that game granting him a break from a complex and
controversial opinion—would explain why Justice Blackmun later said Flood was
his favorite opinion to write.468 The former would provide evidence for structure
behind the baseball trilogy that actively preserves baseball’s exemption. The latter
would indicate the Court at least passively ignored any option that allowed its
revocation of that exemption. In any case, Justice Blackmun’s personal interest
in baseball preserved the exemption at a time when the Court could not only
have found it obsolete, but also abolished it without retroactive effect.
e. Systematic Interpretation
That personal interest finally explains Justice Blackmun’s rejection of Justice
Stewart’s advice to follow the lead set by Toolson and write a per curiam
decision.469 A per curiam stressing that only Congress could abolish the
exemption without retroactive effect “would have been a respectable argument
that would not have been open to the same sort of ridicule as the opinion

461 See Flood, 407 U.S. 258 (Burger, C.J. concurring in all but part I) (White, J., concurring in
all but part I); BANNER, supra note 18, at 210 (showing that Justice Blackmun would later note
that Chief Justice Burger and Justice White perhaps considered the ode to baseball “beneath
the dignity of the Court”); id. at 209 (finding some justices “were appalled. . . with the paean
to baseball”).
462 Cf. Roger I. Abrams, Blackmun’s List, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 181 (2007) (writing an
entire article on the list of baseball players in the “ode” as late as 2007).
463 John B. Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine as Applied, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 745,
745 (1983).
464 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
465 See Flood, 407 U.S. at 285–86 (Burger, C.J., concurring in all but Part I); see also id. at 286–
88 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
466 BANNER, supra note 18, at 206, 215.
467 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 429, at 190.
468 BANNER, supra note 18, at 211.
469 See BANNER, supra note 18, at 207.
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Blackmun actually wrote.”470 This kind of opinion would have left Congress with
a clear mandate to revoke the exemption, which Flood did as well,471 and a per
curiam would have provided no better reason for Congress to act than did Flood.
However, if the exemption was to survive post-Flood, Justice Blackmun’s
approach provided the better long-term solution because of a simple, mostly
overlooked advantage: the opinion was comprehensive.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White might have scorned the ode to baseball
in Part I.472 Yet, the same panache that had Justice Blackmun compiling a list of
players also led him to extensively lay out all legal aspects and characteristics of
the antitrust exemption.473 In Federal Baseball, the Supreme Court had not created
any exemption.474 In Toolson, the Court had created baseball’s antitrust exemption
through a complex system of interdependent implications.475 While these
implications did exempt baseball from federal antitrust scrutiny, they did not
require the lower courts to exempt only baseball from the Sherman Act. Thus,
the Supreme Court clarified via a series of rulings starting with Shubert and
culminating in Radovich and Haywood that no other kind of entertainment, not
even other professional team sports, would be exempt from the antitrust laws.476
In Flood, the Court expressively laid out what Toolson had only implied.
Moreover, Flood consolidated all rulings on the baseball antitrust exemption.
Thus, even if the Flood Court made no law, it provided the lower courts with a
single opinion that provided reliable guidelines for applying the exemption.
Because the Toolson Court never intended to create a permanent exemption for
professional baseball, Flood also stressed that “[a]s long as the Congress continues
to acquiesce [the justices] should adhere to— but not extend— the” baseball
antitrust exemption.477 Flood logically concludes the baseball trilogy by expressing
the general guidelines for the exemption’s scope and stressing the Court’s desire
for Congress to revoke the exemption prospectively.

Id. at 215.
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972); id. at 286 (Burger, C.J., concurring in all but
Part I).
472 Cf. id. at 258, 285–86 (Burger, C.J., concurring in all but Part I and White, J., concurring
in all but Part I).
473 See id. at 269–85.
474 Supra Section I.A.4.
475 See supra Section I.A.4.d. (analyzing these implications).
476 See supra notes 323-28 and accompanying text.
477 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972).
470
471
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APPROACHES BY THE LOWER COURTS

Since Flood, the Supreme Court has adhered to its position of leaving any
future modifications to the baseball antitrust exemption to Congress and has
denied any plea for certiorari on cases involving the relationship between
professional baseball and the Sherman Act.478 The ball is now, so to speak, in the
legislative court.
The only definite congressional action on the issue of the exemption was the
Curt Flood Act.479 This Act was not a result of independent congressional
deliberations but of collective lobbying by the MLB and the MLBPA.480
Consequently, the Curt Flood Act only affects MLB players,481 granting them
“the same rights under the antitrust laws as. . .other professional athletes, e.g.,
football and basketball players” possess.482 The nonstatutory labor exemption
restricts these rights, however, by preventing unionized professional sports
players from bringing antitrust suits over mandatory collective bargaining
matters against their respective leagues.483 While a list of particular subjects left
unaffected by the Curt Flood Act initially created some confusion among legal
scholars,484 the Act must “be read neutrally with regard to baseball’s historic
antitrust exemption in all other respects” than MLB player employment terms.485
Because even these players would have to “decertify,” that is, dissolve, the
MLBPA to gain standing in antitrust cases, the Act’s legal impact is limited.486
“[T]he ultimate fate of baseball’s antitrust exemption remains in the hands of the
judiciary, just as Congress intended.”487
Hence, with the Supreme Court and Congress unwilling to act further upon
the exemption, the inferior courts had to develop benchmarks to delimit their
scope. To this end, the courts have employed three distinct approaches, relieving

478 E.g., Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, 870 F.3d 682 (7th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018); City of San Jose v. Office of the Com’r of
Baseball, 776 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015).
479 Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27a (1998) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 26b
(2012)).
480 Nathaniel Grow, The Curiously Confounding Curt Flood Act, 90 TUL. L. REV. 859, 879–88
(2016).
481 15 U.S.C. § 26(a).
482 15 U.S.C. § 26b(d), Pub. L. No. 105–297, 82, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998).
483 E.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
484 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006); see Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 87
NEB. L. REV. 747, 752–58 (2008) (analyzing the legal effects of the Act and evaluating different
assessments of its scope).
485 Grow, Curiously Confounding, supra note 479, at 900; accord Selig & Mitten, supra note 46, at
1185–86.
486 Grow, Curiously Confounding, supra note 479, at 878–79.
487 Id. at 901.
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the reserve system,488 the entire business of baseball,489 or baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs from federal antitrust scrutiny.490
A. RESERVE SYSTEM

The most restrictive interpretation of the baseball antitrust exemption limits
its scope to baseball’s reserve system. Because the MLB and MLBPA have
negotiated away the reserve system for major league players, the restrictive
approach limits the exemption to the MiLB reserve system. If the MLB and
MLBPA would ever reinstate the reserve system, the scope of the baseball
exemption under the restrictive interpretation would not change because the
Curt Flood Act grants MLB players antitrust protection.
1. Cases
The restrictive interpretation was first applied by the court in Piazza v. Major
League Baseball,491 a case that arose when an investment group led by
Pennsylvanian businessmen Vincent Piazza and Vincent Tirendi tried to buy the
San Francisco Giants for $115 million, intending to move them to Tampa Bay.492
After the background check on Piazza and Tirendi, the MLB rejected the
proposal, selling the Giants to a different investment group for $100 million. 493
Piazza and Tirendi sued the MLB, claiming, inter alia, violations of 15 U.S.C §§
1–2.494 The MLB moved to dismiss this suit by partially asserting that the baseball
trilogy exempted them from antitrust scrutiny.495
The Piazza court held that this exemption only applies to the reserve
system,496 thereby dismissing the Seventh Circuit’s ruling from Charles O. Finley
& Co. v. Kuhn,497 considering it “bad law and therefore of no precedential
value.”498 It stressed that “[n]either Finley nor any other case cited by [Organized
Baseball]. . . has undertaken such an analysis of the Supreme Court’s baseball

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
490 See infra Section II.C.
491 Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
492 Id. at 422.
493 Id. at 422–23.
494 Id. at 423–24.
495 Id. at 421.
496 Id.
497 Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876
(1978); see infra Section II.B.1. (analyzing Finley).
498 Deborah L. Spander, The Impact of Piazza on the Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 2 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 113, 122 (1995).
488
489
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trilogy” as the Piazza court had.499 Because the Piazza court found that the
Supreme Court only exempted the reserve system from antitrust scrutiny, it held
the exemption inapplicable to the current case500 and consequently dismissed the
MLB’s motion.501
At least two courts followed the Piazza court’s narrow application. The failed
relocation of the Giants to Tampa Bay that sparked Piazza also resulted in the
case of Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs (Butterworth I),502
in which the Florida Supreme Court considered whether Florida’s Attorney
General could investigate the MLB for antitrust violations and issue civil
investigative demands in this regard.503 The court in Butterworth I followed Piazza
against the “great weight of federal cases regarding the scope of the exemption”
because “none of the other cases [had] engaged in such a comprehensive analysis
of Flood and its implications.”504 Other failed attempts to bring an MLB team to
Tampa Bay resulted in Morsani v. Major League Baseball,505 also ruling that
baseball’s exemption was limited to its reserve system, citing the Florida Supreme
Court’s binding authority in Butterworth I.506
2. Analysis
Morsani relied on Butterworth I’s binding authority, which in turn followed the
reasoning in Piazza.507 Therefore, the validity of all three rulings and the
restrictive approach depends on the quality of Piazza’s rationale. Butterworth I
might correctly find Piazza to be the first comprehensive judicial analysis of Flood.
Piazza might even correctly find that none of the “case[s] cited by [Organized]
Baseball . . . ha[d] undertaken such an analysis of the Supreme Court’s baseball
trilogy.”508 A close examination of the Piazza reasoning however, demonstrates
why no other court has undertaken such an analysis. Piazza’s comprehensiveness
allowed the court to thoroughly misunderstand the baseball trilogy.
The Piazza court correctly finds that “[i]n each of the three cases [in the
baseball trilogy,] the factual context involved the reserve clause.”509 Beyond that,
it errs in its assessment of each baseball trilogy case and the interrelationships

Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438.
Id.
501 Id. at 441.
502 Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs (Butterworth I), 644 So.2d 1021 (Fla.
1994).
503 Id. at 1022.
504 Id. at 1025.
505 Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 663 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
506 Id. at 657.
507 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 592.
508 Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
509 Id. at 435–36.
499
500
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therein.510 Therefore, in McCoy v. Major League Baseball,511 a federal court ruled
against restricting the exemption to the reserve system. In 2003, when the
Eleventh Circuit upheld a broader scope of the exemption in Major League Baseball
v. Crist,512 the restrictive interpretation became obsolete.513 The reserve system
was held to be the relevant activity in Flood and part of baseball’s antitrust
exemption; it does not define that exemption’s scope.
B. THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL

Opposite to the restrictive view of Piazza is the opinion that the baseball
antitrust exemption covers the entire business of baseball. Since Flood, a majority
of lower courts have followed this approach.514 Notably, all federal appellate
courts have defined the exemption’s scope to include the whole business of
baseball.515 Yet, if the business of baseball determines the scope of the baseball
antitrust exemption, the courts must outline this business. While some courts
only hold the business of baseball exempt from antitrust laws,516 others have
defined the scope of that business regarding single issues.517
1. Cases
In Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn,518 the Ninth Circuit simply cited Flood to
find that “the plaintiff’s claim for relief under the antitrust laws was properly
dismissed.”519 The Seventh Circuit defined the exemption’s scope in Charles O.
Finley & Co. v. Kuhn520 as “the business of baseball, not any particular facet of

See supra Section I.D.4.a. (refuting the Piazza court’s interpretation of Flood).
McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F.Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995); see also infra
Section II.B.1. (analyzing the McCoy case).
512 Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003).
513 See CARFAGNA, supra note 7, at 92; see also infra notes 543-545 and accompanying text
(analyzing Crist).
514 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 581.
515 Selig & Mitten, supra note 46, at 1184 (citing a series of cases at 1184–85 n.72).
516 See e.g. Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 876 (1978) (defining the scope of the exemption as “the business of baseball”).
517 See e.g. Minn. Twins P’ship v. State, 592 N.W.2d 847, 856 (Minn. 1999) (holding franchise
sales and relocations to be part of the business of baseball and therefore exempt from antitrust
scrutiny); see generally infra Section II.B.1 (analyzing cases that were decided according to the
business-of-baseball approach).
518 Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
519 Id. at 1103 (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)).
520 Finley, 569 F.2d at 527.
510
511
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that business.”521 The Finley case arose when Charles O. Finley alleged, inter alia,
violations of federal antitrust law after Commissioner Bowie Kuhn had rejected
a mid-season sale of several players from the Oakland Athletics, the Boston Red
Sox, and New York Yankees.522 Finley tried to avoid dismissal by arguing that
Flood restricted the baseball antitrust exemption to the reserve system.523 The
court remarked in a footnote that “this exemption does not apply wholesale to
all cases which may have some attenuated relation to the business of baseball.”524
However, the court rejected Finley’s argument that the exemption only applied
to the reserve system, finding that “it appears clear from the entire opinions in
the three baseball cases, as well as from Radovich, that the Supreme Court
intended to exempt the [entire] business of baseball . . . from the antitrust
laws.”525 In McCoy v. Major League Baseball,526 a class action antitrust lawsuit fans
and owners of businesses near MLB stadia filed after the 1994 players strike, 527
another federal court ruled in favor of this broad interpretation of the baseball
antitrust exemption.528
League structure is the single most common issue in antitrust claims against
professional baseball.529 The MLB controls not just franchise expansion but also
the sale, relocation, and merger of existing teams.530 After the National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL) retracted its conditional
approval of a purchase and relocation of the minor league Charlotte Knights, the
Eastern District of Louisiana ruled in New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc.531 that the Supreme Court had
exempted the business of baseball from federal antitrust scrutiny and that
franchise relocation was part of this business.532 In Minnesota Twins Partnership v.
State,533 another case involving franchise sales and relocations, the Minnesota
Supreme Court acknowledged that “the Flood opinion is not clear about the
Id. at 541.
Id. at 531.
523 Id. at 540.
524 Id. at 541 n.51.
525 Id. at 541.
526 McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F.Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
527 Id. at 455–56.
528 Id. at 457 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)).
529 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 606–07; see also Mark Nagel et. al., Major League
Baseball Anti-Trust Immunity: Examining the Legal and Financial Implications of Relocation Rules, 11–
15 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Paper No. 25799, 2010), https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/25799/1/MPRA_paper_25799.pdf (analyzing “league relocation cases”)(last
visited Oct. 12, 2019).
530 See generally CARFAGNA, supra note 7, at 90–94 (examining the league structure); see also
generally Nagel et. al, supra note 528, at 15–21 (analyzing the “history of MLB territorial rules”).
531 New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc., No.
93-253, 1994 WL 631144 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994).
532 Id. at *8–9.
533 Minn. Twins P’ship v. State, 592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999).
521
522
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extent of the conduct that is exempt from antitrust laws.”534 Nevertheless, it
found franchise sales and relocations unquestionably part of the business of
baseball and dismissed the case with the interpretation that the entire business is
exempt from antitrust scrutiny.535
Beyond these aspects unquestionably in the business of baseball, the courts
also had to engage with third-party contracts and the exemption’s relation to
state antitrust laws. In State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.,536 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the league’s structure was not subject to those laws.537 Because
of the Supremacy Clause,538 the baseball antitrust exemption precludes the states
from subjecting professional baseball to their respective antitrust laws.539 When
the Florida Attorney General issued Civil Investigative Demands due to potential
violations of antitrust law by the MLB’s contraction of two franchises, the case
of Major League Baseball v. Butterworth (Butterworth II) began.540 The court
comprehensively analyzed the baseball trilogy and Supreme Court rulings that
prevented other sports leagues from invoking the baseball antitrust exemption,
concluding that this exemption relieved the business of baseball from federal and
state antitrust laws.541 Then, the court found the number of clubs in the league
“integral to the business of major league baseball” and thus exempt from
antitrust scrutiny.542 This decision was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Major
League Baseball v. Crist.543 While the Circuit commented, as an aside, that relations
between professional baseball clubs and the third parties in Crist were outside the
exemption,544 it ruled that the exemption did encompass the entire business of
baseball, namely, the number of MLB clubs.545 More recently, the exemption of
franchise relocations from antitrust scrutiny was confirmed in City of San Jose v.
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball.546 The case arose after the MLB established a
534 Id. at 854; see also McMahon & Rossi, supra note 15, at 243 (stating the baseball trilogy
does “not provide any helpful guidance as to the bounds of the exemption”).
535 Minn. Twins, 592 N.W.2d at 856.
536 State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
537 Id. at 18.
538 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
539 Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 18.
540 Major League Baseball v. Butterworth (Butterworth II), 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla.
2001).
541 Id. at 1322–31.
542 Id. at 1332.
543 Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003).
544 Id. at 1183.
545 Id.
546 City of San Jose v. Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015).
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“special Relocation Committee” to evaluate the impact of a planned relocation
of the Oakland Athletics to San José. The Athletics had entered an agreement
with San José that gave them the option to buy parcels for a stadium from the
city. “[F]our years later the committee was ‘still at work,’ with no resolution in
sight.”547 The city considered “the delay . . . MLB’s attempt to stymie the
relocation” and filed suit, alleging, inter alia, violations of state and federal
antitrust laws.548 The Ninth Circuit found “that the Supreme Court intended to
exempt the business of baseball” from antitrust scrutiny.549 The Circuit dismissed
the federal antitrust claims, holding that “Flood plainly extends to questions of
franchise relocation.”550 “[B]ecause ‘state antitrust regulation would conflict with
federal policy and because national uniformity is required in any regulation of
baseball,’” the Circuit also dismissed the state antitrust claims.551 In Right Field
Rooftops, LLC v. Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC,552 the Seventh Circuit opposed
the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Crist and applied the exemption to the relation
between the Chicago Cubs and owners of the “Wrigley rooftops.”553 The
business of baseball includes contracts with non-baseball entities and the
exemption extends to state laws.
If contracts with third parties are part of the business of baseball then, a
fortiori, so too are player contracts. In Miranda v. Selig,554 the Ninth Circuit held
MiLB players’ contracts exempt from antitrust scrutiny.555 Similarly, in Professional
Baseball Schools and Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn,556 the Eleventh Circuit found baseball’s
antitrust exemption “anomalous” but “well established” and found MiLB
players’ employment terms outside the scope of the antitrust laws.557 In Salerno,
the Second Circuit held even major league umpires exempt from antitrust
scrutiny.558 In Wyckoff v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, two former MLB

Id. at 688.
Id.
549 Id. at 690 (quoting Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir. 1978).
550 Id. at 692.
551 Id. at 691 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972)).
552 Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chi. Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, 870 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018).
553 The design of Wrigley Field allows viewing the outfield from the surrounding rooftops.
In addition to the antitrust issues at question in Right Field Rooftops, this particular location has
repeatedly led to claims of copyright infringement and unfair competition claims by the Cubs.
See generally Charley Shifley & Patrick Shifley, Who Owns the View? Chicago Cubs v. Rooftop Owners,
Or Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Sky Box on Waveland, L.L.C, 1 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 70 (2003).
554 Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-453, 138 S. Ct. 507
(2017).
555 Id. at 1238.
556 Prof’l Baseball Sch. and Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1982).
557 Id. at 1085–86.
558 Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
547
548
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scouts claimed that MLB teams colluded to suppress scouts’ salaries.559 The
Circuit found itself bound not only by the Supreme Court’s precedent in the
baseball trilogy but also by its own precedent from Salerno, highlighting that Flood
had not restricted the baseball exemption.560
As highlighted by the Finley court, even the business of baseball does not
encompass every activity remotely related to professional baseball. In the
Laumann/Garber action, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York
addressed the relationship between broadcasting rights, the baseball antitrust
exemption, and the Curt Flood Act.561 He found that Congress “includ[ing]
[these rights] in a long list of topics that would remain unchanged by the Act”
did not necessarily mean they could be considered part of the “business of
baseball.”562 Because broadcasting rights are “not central to the business of
baseball,” they are subject to antitrust scrutiny.563
2. Analysis
The primary argument against the business-of-baseball approach is that it
“fail[s] to provide any reasonable limiting factors for future courts to apply” or
“a workable standard . . . when deciding whether allegedly anticompetitive
conduct falls within the bounds of baseball’s antitrust exemption.”564 None of
these rulings provide guidelines for determining the exact scope of the business
of baseball beyond their respective cases,565 and this argument confuses the
functions of rulings by the Supreme Court when compared to those of the lower
courts. While Supreme Court rulings should provide general guidelines, the lower
courts are expected to narrowly resolve the issue before them,566 possessing
neither the mandate nor the power to provide a workable standard for all other
subsequent cases on the issue.
Another point of criticism raised against the business-of-baseball approach is
that it would “lead to absurd results.”567 A literal interpretation might allow any
activity conducted by a professional baseball team to be included in the
exemption, the results of which would indeed be irrational. For instance, if the
559 Wyckoff v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 705 Fed. Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018).
560 Id. at 28–29.
561 Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), motion to
certify appeal denied sub nom. Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
562 Laumann, 56 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
563 Id.
564 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 601–02.
565 See id. at 583.
566 See Stinson, supra note 416, at 221.
567 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 602.
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MLB decided to purchase all gas stations in the United States, some of the MLB
gasoline would be used by fans driving to baseball games, but the antitrust
exemption would not relieve the MLB from antitrust scrutiny regarding the
monopoly interest.568 If the MLB acquired all steel mills in the United States, its
involvement in the steel industry would be subject to antitrust law, even if some
of the steel were used to build and maintain baseball stadiums. The owners could
not exempt their other businesses from federal antitrust scrutiny by attaching
pictures of baseballs or the MLB logo to their business cards and stationery, even
if they supported their teams with those businesses’ profits. Extending the
baseball antitrust exemption to any of those activities would be ludicrous. In any
event, the argument that courts defining the scope of the exemption as the
business of baseball would exempt such conduct from antitrust scrutiny is a straw
man by proponents of the more restrictive approaches. Since Finley, the courts
have held that an “attenuated relation to the business of baseball” does not
provide relief from antitrust laws.569
C. BASEBALL’S UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS AND NEEDS

The final approach relies on Flood holding that the baseball antitrust
exemption “rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs.”570 Two courts have taken this intermediate position.
Similar to the business-of-baseball approach, the unique-characteristics-andneeds approach misinterprets the baseball trilogy.
1. Cases
The first ruling following this approach originated in the sale of baseball
broadcasting rights. The leagues are entitled to sell these rights on the national
level, while the teams retain the rights to negotiate regional broadcasting
agreements.571 The individual teams’ negotiation rights for in-market games led
to Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Association.572 Henderson, a radio
broadcaster, alleged that the Houston Astros violated federal and state antitrust
laws by canceling their contract with its station, KYST-AM, to grant another
station exclusive broadcasting rights in Houston.573 The Astros argued that these
“actions fall within the baseball exemption from the antitrust laws.”574 The court
disagreed, holding that “broadcasting is not central enough to the ‘unique
See id. (finding this example not “reasonabl[e]” but “absurd”).
Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 n.51 (7th Cir. 1978).
570 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (emphasis added).
571 CARFAGNA, supra note 7, at 98–99; see also Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense
Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891, 916–20 (2008) (analyzing the allocation of
broadcasting revenues in professional sports leagues).
572 Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
573 Id. at 264.
574 Id.
568
569
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characteristics and needs’ of baseball which the exemption was created to
protect.”575 The baseball trilogy exempts from antitrust scrutiny “only those
aspects of baseball, such as leagues, clubs and players which are integral to the
sport and not related activities which merely enhance its commercial success.”576
Furthermore, the baseball trilogy also noted that “[r]adio broadcasting is not a
part of the sport in the way . . . players, umpires, the league structure and the
reserve system are.”577 The court adopted Henderson’s “argument that an
exempt baseball team, like a labor union or agricultural cooperative, which is
exempted from the Sherman Act by statute, loses its exemption when it
combines with a non-exempt radio station.”578
In Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,579 an umpire asserted
that the wrongful termination of her contract by the National League constituted
not only employment discrimination but also a violation of state antitrust law.580
When the court assessed whether the federal baseball antitrust exemption
preempted state antitrust laws, it found that Congress had not expressively
indicated its intention to preempt state law.581 Hence, “Congress intended the
federal anti-trust laws to supplement, not displace, state anti-trust remedies.”582
The Postema court went on to highlight that the baseball trilogy only considered
the exemption in the context of the reserve system and therefore provides little
guidance for determining its scope.583 The court cited Flood to show that the
exemption “rests on a recognition and acceptance of baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs” and argued that the exemption’s scope would be
limited accordingly.584 The Postema court found its opinion was supported by the
ruling in Milwaukee Braves, noting that the exemption was limited to those matters
“incidental to the maintenance of the league structure.”585 The Postema court also
cited Henderson, finding the baseball exemption was restricted to “the reserve

Id. at 268–69.
Id. at 265.
577 Id. at 269.
578 Id. at 271 n.9.
579 Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (1993).
580 Id. at 1477.
581 Id. at 1488 (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972)).
582 Id. (citing California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102, 109 (1989).
583 Id.
584 Id. (citing Flood, 407 U.S. at 282).
585 Id. (citing State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966), cert. denied, 87 S. Ct.
598 (1966)); see also supra notes 535–38 and accompanying text (analyzing Milwaukee Braves).
575
576
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system or to league structure.”586 The court concluded that only baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs, namely, the reserve system and the league structure,
are within the scope of the exemption.587 It found that because “[a]nticompetitive conduct toward umpires is not an essential part of baseball . . . the
baseball exemption does not encompass umpire employment relations.”588 Thus,
even the first two courts that followed the unique-characteristics-and-needs
approach differed in their assessment of those characteristics and needs.
2. Analysis
By taking the intermediate position, the unique-characteristics-and-needs
approach counterintuitively combines the disadvantages of both alternatives.
The restrictive approach violates the Supreme Court’s precedent in the baseball
trilogy because it interprets the Flood Court’s four mentions of the reserve system
to mean that the antitrust exemption pertains to the reserve system alone.589 The
intermediate view draws a similar conclusion from a single mention of baseball’s
unique characteristics and needs. Yet, in that very paragraph, the Supreme Court
twice calls the exemption an “aberration” that it concedes to have created and
upheld in “five consecutive cases” over the course of “half a century.”590 The
Flood Court’s intention was thus not to restrict but to justify the exemption.591
If the Flood Court had limited baseball’s exemption to its unique
characteristics and needs, it would have had to evaluate the reserve system
according to these criteria. Instead, the Court based its decision on Organized
Baseball’s longstanding reliance upon the exemption and congressional
inaction.592 Additionally, Flood quoted Radovich: “[s]ince Toolson and Federal
Baseball are still cited as controlling authority . . . we now specifically limit the rule
there established to the facts there involved, i.e., the business of organized
professional baseball.”593 If the Court had intended to limit the exemption
further, for instance, to baseball’s unique characteristics and needs, it would have
done so expressly. The baseball antitrust exemption is not limited to those
characteristics and needs, but “rests on [their] recognition and acceptance.”594
The reserve system was the factual starting point in Flood, but the majority
opinion ruled on other fact, as well.595 Likewise, the majority opinion was not
limited to baseball’s unique characteristics and needs as its legal starting point.

586 Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1488–89 (citing Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports
Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982)).
587 See id. at 1489.
588 Id.
589 See supra Section II.A.2.
590 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
591 See Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 600–01.
592 See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283–84.
593 Id. at 279 (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1957)).
594 Id. at 282.
595 See supra Section II.A.2.
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The legal analysis culminated in a quotation of Toolson: “the business of baseball”
was outside “the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”596
The primary objection to the business-of-baseball approach is that it fails to
establish general guidelines.597 While that argument confuses the roles of the
Supreme Court and the lower courts,598 the unique-characteristics-and-needs
approach provides little improvement. The intermediate approach substitutes the
need to define the business of baseball with the need to define baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs. In fact, even the first two courts that employed the
unique-characteristics-and-needs approach disagree on what these characteristics
and needs entail. The dictum in Henderson matter-of-factly presented umpires as
an example covered by the baseball exemption, whereas the Postema court held
their employment terms subject to antitrust scrutiny.599
In summary, the business-of-baseball approach complies with the Supreme
Court precedent in the baseball trilogy but fails to provide a clear benchmark for
future courts. The restriction to the reserve system provides a clear benchmark
but violates the Supreme Court precedent. The unique-characteristics-and-needs
approach is less vague than the business-of-baseball approach but still fails to
provide definite guidelines for future courts; it violates the Supreme Court
precedent less obviously and extensively than the restrictive approach but
violates it nevertheless.
IV.

THE BASEBALL ANTITRUST EXEMPTION

A 1995 article by John J. McMahon and John P. Rossi states that “the scope
of baseball’s antitrust exemption has become whatever the reviewing court says
it is.”600 While McMahon and Rossi intended the above statement to show their
disdain for arbitrary decisions by the lower courts, these decisions are how law
is made. The courts have developed antitrust law as a new “‘common law’ in the
same way that a new jurisdiction customarily does – that is, by using certain
customary techniques of judicial reasoning, considering the reasoning and results
of other common law courts, and developing, refining, and innovating in the
dynamic common law tradition.”601 The lower courts have developed the
596 Flood, 407 U.S. at 285 (quoting Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357
(1953) (emphasis added).
597 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 601.
598 See supra note 563 and accompanying text (refuting this argument in the context of the
business-of-baseball approach).
599 Supra note 576.
600 McMahon & Rossi, supra note 15, at 243.
601 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 86, at ¶ 1501.
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baseball antitrust exemption the same way. For instance, the Piazza court used
customary techniques of judicial reasoning in an attempt to innovate the scope
of the exemption because it considered the reasoning of other lower courts
insufficient.602
A. DEFINING THE SCOPE

This article proposes a two-stage test derived from Supreme Court precedent
in light of the existing lower court decisions and reflecting the tests the courts
apply to regular antitrust cases.603 The baseball trilogy exempts the entire business
of baseball from antitrust scrutiny.604 The reserve system is but one of baseball’s
unique characteristics and needs, which are only one aspect of the business of
baseball.605 However, the ongoing discussion in the courts and the academic
literature, over forty years after the final baseball trilogy ruling, attests to the
difficulty of delimitating that business.606 Despite their inability to determine the
entire scope of the antitrust exemption, the more limited approaches provide
courts with more workable standards.607 Hence, while the Supreme Court
precedent defines the scope of the exemption as the business of baseball, an
efficient judiciary must acknowledge its more clearly defined aspects. Future
courts should administer a two-stage test and delimit the scope of the baseball
antitrust exemption based upon whether the conduct in question is exempt per
se and, if not, whether it is part of the business of baseball.
1. Exempt Per Se
Just as “plainly anticompetitive” activities require “no elaborate study of the
industry” to be found violative of antitrust laws,608 conduct that corresponds to
baseball’s unique characteristics requires no elaborate interpretation of the
baseball trilogy to come within the baseball exemption. Conduct that
See supra Section II.A.1. (analyzing Piazza).
See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text (analyzing the illegal-per-se rule and the rule
of reason test in antitrust jurisdiction).
604 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346
U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922).
605 See supra Section II.C.2.
606 See supra Section II.B. (analyzing court rulings that employ the business-of-baseball
approach); see also supra notes 15–27 and accompanying text (scrutinizing the prevailing
opinion on the baseball trilogy among the courts and scholarly commentators).
607 See supra Section II.C.2. (finding the unique-characteristics-and-needs approach slightly
more workable than the business-of-baseball approach); cf. supra notes 61-77 and
accompanying text (defining the reserve system, the only part of baseball exempted by the
restrictive approach ); compare Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 591 (finding the
restrictive approach “fundamentally flawed”), and id. at 600 (finding the intermediate approach
“[a]lso [f]lawed”), with id. at 601 (finding that the business-of-baseball approach “fail[s] to
provide any reasonable limiting factors”).
608 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (quoting Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng. v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
602
603
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corresponds to those characteristics and needs is per se protected by the
exemption. The reserve system is unequivocally such conduct and therefore part
of the baseball antitrust exemption. Moreover, unlike other criteria of the
baseball exemption’s scope, this system is clearly defined. Thus, the courts
should first scrutinize whether disputed conduct is part of that system.
Since, at present, the reserve system exists only in the minor leagues, passing
the first test shows that the conduct in question is exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
If the MLB reinstated a reserve system, a positive result would still provide a
definite answer: the MiLB reserve system would remain exempt from antitrust
scrutiny, while pursuant to the Curt Flood Act, the MLB reserve system would
not.
If the disputed conduct is not part of the reserve system, the court determines
whether it corresponds to one of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs
according to Henderson’s extensive approach. New issues fall within the scope of
the antitrust exemption if they are uniquely crucial to or characteristic of
professional baseball. For instance, rubbing mud is uniquely necessary to play
baseball and a unique characteristic of the game.609 Hence, antitrust laws would
not prevent baseball teams from uniting to lower the price of that mud.
2. The Business of Baseball
If the conduct in question is neither part of the reserve system nor another
of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs, the court analyzes whether it is
part of the general business of baseball. An affirmative answer shows that the
matter is exempt from antitrust scrutiny, while a negative answer subjects the
issue to the antitrust laws. Because of the complex nature and undetermined
scope of the business of baseball, this step requires case-by-case review.
Some commentators add a qualifier to the business of baseball. For instance,
based on the language in Federal Baseball and Toolson, Nathaniel Grow argues the
exemption should denote the “business of supplying baseball entertainment to
the public.”610 A student comment by Ari Khuner Haber rests on the language
in Toolson and Flood, advocating the following interpretation: “the business of
providing baseball games to the public for profit.”611
Grow highlights that “Justice Holmes provided a ‘summary statement of the
nature of the business involved,’ emphasizing the fact that baseball teams ‘play
against one another in public exhibitions for money’” and stated that “‘[t]he

609 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (presenting the practice of applying that mud
to all baseballs used in professional games).
610 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 577; see generally id. at 577–80 (proposing this
benchmark).
611 Haber, supra note 15, at 43; see generally id. at 43 (proposing this benchmark).
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business is giving exhibitions of baseball.’”612 The Federal Baseball Court found
the business of baseball to be intrastate because that business consisted of
baseball games, which, for lack of live broadcasting, were purely intrastate at the
time.613 However, Grow also provides a sound argument to refute his own
proposal. When discussing Piazza, he demonstrates that the “court read too
much into Flood’s few passing references to baseball’s reserve system. Because
the reserve clause was the sole anticompetitive restraint at issue in the case, it was
only natural that the Flood majority would reference the clause in its opinion.”614
Similarly, because at the time of Federal Baseball the game of baseball was the only
significant aspect of the business of baseball,615 it was only natural that Justice
Holmes would significantly reference it when describing that business. Grow
implicitly agrees with Haber’s claim that the relevant “business. . . should be
construed in its modern incarnation”616 when he shows that the evolution of that
business extended to broadcasting agreements.617 Federal Baseball provides little
reason to assume that the entire business of baseball has expanded but that the
Supreme Court nonetheless exempts only those parts concerning the exhibition
of the game.
Both articles quote Toolson as finding that Federal Baseball exempted “the
business of providing public baseball games for profit” from antitrust scrutiny.618
Though Grow concedes that “the Toolson opinion ultimately reinterpreted Federal
Baseball” with regard to the earlier opinion’s statement about congressional
intent, he claims that “the decision nevertheless confirms the [exemption’s]
scope . . . as being focused on the business of supplying baseball exhibitions to
the public.”619 Grow also admits that “the Flood Court did not explicitly focus its
analysis on supplying baseball exhibitions to the public,”620 whereas Haber claims
Flood supports his argument by citing the case en large as affirming Toolson.621 Even
if Grow and Haber’s interpretation of Federal Baseball and the opening statement
in Toolson were correct, Toolson would have stripped the business of baseball of
612 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 577 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.
Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922)).
613 Id.
614 Id. at 593; see supra notes 400–411 (citing, inter alia, Grow to reject the claim that references
to the reserve system in Flood restricted the opinion to the reserve clause).
615 See Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208–09 (holding other aspects of the business of baseball
incident to the exhibitions); see also Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 567 (analyzing
those incidental interstate aspects).
616 Haber, supra note 15, at 43.
617 See Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 567–69 (analyzing the evolving character
of the business of baseball); id. at 617–18 (finding that the baseball exemption should include
broadcasting agreements).
618 Id. at 577–78 (quoting Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per
curiam)); Haber, supra note 15, at 43 n.248 (quoting Toolson, 356 U.S. at 357).
619 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 578.
620 Id.
621 See Haber, supra note 15, at 43 n.248.
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its qualifier. The Toolson opinion upheld Federal Baseball only “so far as that
decision” found “the business of baseball [outside] the scope of the federal
antitrust laws.”622 Toolson changed every aspect of Federal Baseball except those
that had exempted the business of baseball from antitrust scrutiny.623 The Toolson
exemption covered the business of baseball without any of the restrictions of the
Federal Baseball exception.624
Finally, Grow claims that Flood supports his view because the Court’s
emphasis on stare decisis showed adherence to the earlier cases’ points of
focus.625 Even Justice Blackmun’s ode to baseball highlights the importance of
the game for the exemption.626 Yet, because Toolson had exempted the entire
business of baseball, the Flood Court’s reliance on stare decisis argues against a
qualified business of baseball. Since Flood brings no legal changes, but is the only
case in the trilogy that clearly lays out the different aspects of the exemption, 627
Justice Blackmun would have emphasized any intention he had to restrict Toolson.
Similar to the lower courts’ attempts to create an antitrust exemption
narrower than the business of baseball, narrowing the scope of that business
through qualifiers violates the Supreme Court’s precedent. Nevertheless, just as
the reserve system is a salient part of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs
that are part of the business of baseball, providing public baseball games for
profit is a substantial part of that business. Therefore, any conduct directly
related to presenting games to the public is part of the business of baseball.
B. LABOR RELATIONS

The most clearly defined aspect of the business of baseball and the exemption
is baseball’s reserve system and thereby the employment terms of baseball
players.628 Then again, the Curt Flood Act grants MLB players the same antitrust
protection that players in other professional sports leagues enjoy,629 and their
contracts are hence outside the scope of the exemption. MiLB players, however,

Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
See supra Section I.C.4. (analyzing Toolson).
624 See supra Section I.C.4.d. (scrutinizing the legal effects of Toolson).
625 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 578.
626 Id. at 579–80.
627 See supra Section I.D.4.e. (conducting a systematic analysis of the legal effects of Flood).
628 See supra Section II.A. (analyzing an attempt by lower courts to restrict the exemption to
the reserve system).
629 15 U.S.C. § 26b; see supra notes 478-89 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal impact
of the Act on MLB player contracts).
622
623

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

67

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3

88

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 27:1

are explicitly excluded from the Curt Flood Act,630 and their employment terms
thus remain within the scope of the antitrust exemption.
While the courts are divided on antitrust protection for baseball umpires, 631
the only court ruling in their favor was Postema, which followed the uniquecharacteristics-and-needs approach.632 Henderson, the first court that applied this
approach, had already shown that it allows exempting umpire contracts from the
Sherman Act.633 Postema ignored not just Henderson but, more importantly, the
precedent from Salerno that the Supreme Court had implicitly approved in
Flood.634 “Anti-competitive conduct toward umpires” might not be “an essential
part of baseball”635 per se, but that argument rests on false criteria for
determining the scope of the exemption. Umpires are an essential part of
baseball’s unique characteristics and needs and therefore of the business of
baseball. They provide the “neutral rule-enforcement” characteristic of any “fair
and orderly” game.636 Their knowledge of baseball’s rules is needed by
professional baseball. Thus, umpires are part of the business of baseball and their
employment terms are exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
Wyckoff held that Salerno applies to baseball scouts.637 Similarly, without
“professional baseball, the market for the services of . . . managers, or coaches
would be substantially smaller, if not altogether non-existent.”638 Baseball
coaches and team managers are part of the unique needs of professional baseball.
The labor relations of baseball umpires, scouts, coaches, managers, and MiLB
players thus fall within the scope of the antitrust exemption.
C. LEAGUE STRUCTURE AND BASEBALL RULES

While the courts that applied the restrictive interpretation ruled on labor
relations, “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a decision more integral to the business
of major league baseball than the number of clubs that will be allowed to
compete.”639 These characteristics and needs indisputably include any questions
pertaining to the league structure. In fact, the general league structure, not the

15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(2).
Compare Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball, 429 F.2d 1003, 1004–05 (2d Cir. 1970)
(exempting umpires from antitrust scrutiny) with Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball
Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting umpires antitrust protection).
632 See supra notes 587 and accompanying text (showing the reasoning behind the Postema
court’s extension of antitrust protection to umpires).
633 See supra notes 574-76 and accompanying text (analyzing the reasoning in Henderson).
634 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 619.
635 Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489.
636 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 618.
637 Id. at 29.
638 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 618.
639 Major League Baseball v. Butterworth (Butterworth II), 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1332 (N.D.
Fla. 2001).
630
631
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reserve system, provided the facts in question in Federal Baseball.640 As the core
of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs, that entire structure is exempt
from antitrust scrutiny.641
Moreover, a sports league must establish the rules of its game. If one team
considered its players “out” after three strikes and the other team after four, the
two could not play each other.642 If the teams could not agree on the parameters
that decide the winner of a match, none of them could effectively win, rendering
the game, at best, soccer. Other professional sports leagues’ rulemaking does not
violate antitrust laws.643 Therefore, rulemaking by the MLB, the National League,
and the American League is part of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs
and falls under the baseball antitrust exemption.
D. THIRD-PARTY AGREEMENTS

In contrast to baseball-related entities, including contracts with non-baseball
entities into the baseball antitrust exemption remains contentious. Each type of
contract, broadcasting agreement, licensing agreement, and sponsorship
agreement provides specific challenges to the exemption. Yet, these challenges
are moot if third-party agreements are per se outside the scope of baseball’s
antitrust exemption.
These agreements are not part of the reserve system and, because they involve
entities beyond the realm of baseball, they are not among baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs. Thus, they are only exempt from antitrust scrutiny if
they are part of the general business of baseball. In Henderson, the court subjected
third-party contracts to antitrust scrutiny and held that “an exempt baseball team
. . . loses its exemption when it combines with a non-exempt” entity.644 However,
in Right Field Rooftops, the Seventh Circuit held third-party agreements to be part
640 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
207–08 (1922); see also supra Section I.A.1. (analyzing the facts behind Federal Baseball).
641 See City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d. 686 (9th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015); Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp.
1475, 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp.
263, 265, 269 (S.D. Tex. 1982) see also supra Section II.C. (analyzing Postema and Henderson); see
also supra notes 528-45 (analyzing rulings that exempt decisions pertaining to the league
structure as part of the business of baseball).
642 Cf. Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law,
119 Yale L.J. 726, 730 (2010) (remarking that “if [football] teams disagreed as to whether a
first down requires ten yards or fifteen yards of advancement, they could not play each other”).
643 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1097 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that
in a sports league, “member clubs must cooperate in a variety of ways, and may do so lawfully,
in order to make the . . . league a success”).
644 Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 271 n.9.
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of the business of baseball and therefore included in the antitrust exemption; the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.645
Similar to restricting the antitrust exemption to the reserve system or
baseball’s unique characteristics and needs,646 excluding relations with nonbaseball entities from its scope is not entirely illogical, but it finds no justification
in Supreme Court precedent.647 Rather, the Court’s insurance jurisprudence
shows that an antitrust exemption for a particular business includes third-party
relations that are part of that business. Like baseball, insurance companies
initially were held not to constitute interstate commerce, which would exempt
them from federal antitrust scrutiny.648 While the antitrust exemption preserved
this status for baseball, the Supreme Court eventually held insurance companies
subject to the Sherman Act.649 Congress then created a statutory antitrust
exemption for insurers by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act.650 The
“business of insurance” that this Act privileges is analogous to the “business of
baseball.”651 In 1969, the Supreme Court generally restricted the business of
insurance to relations with policyholders.652 In 1982, however, the Court
specified three criteria to define that business: It must (1) spread or transfer the
policyholder’s risk, (2) be integral to the insurer-policyholder relationship, and
(3) be “limited to entities within the insurance industry.”653 Notably, the Court
held that none of these criteria would be sufficient alone.654 Moreover, the
primary purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not to exempt the business
of insurance from antitrust scrutiny but to leave it to the states.655 While the
business of baseball has a broad scope, “the narrowness of the [insurance]

645 Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chi. Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, 870 F.3d 682, 688–89 (7th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018).
646 See supra Section II.A.2. (finding that restricting the exemption to the reserve system
violates Supreme Court precedent); see supra Section II.C.2. (finding the same for baseball’s
unique characteristics and needs).
647 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (abstaining from any consideration of third-party
relations); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356(1953) (same); Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt.,
Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (same).
648 See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
649 United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944).
650 McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2012).
651 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 603–04.
652 See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (implying this limitation in a decision on
states preempting federal securities law); see also Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (finding an agreement between Blue Shield and participating
pharmacies outside the business of insurance because it involves neither underwriting nor risk
spreading).
653 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Piero, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
654 Id.
655 Eric Peter Gillett, The Business of Insurance: Exemption, Exemption, Who has the Antitrust
Exemption., 17 PAC. L.J. 261, 265 (1985); see infra Section III.E. (showing baseball exempt from
state antitrust laws).
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exemption . . . undermine[s] the claimed benefit of an exemption.”656 If the intraindustry criterion is insufficient to delimitate the narrow business of insurance,
it cannot define the scope of the business of baseball. Thus, third-party contracts
can hypothetically be part of the business of baseball.
1. Broadcasting Agreements
Arguably, the most significant of these contracts are broadcasting
agreements.657 Consequently, Hale v. Brooklyn Baseball Club, Inc.,658 the first
decision on the relation between baseball’s antitrust exemption and its
broadcasting activities, held that “there couldn’t be such broadcasting except for
the old-fashioned baseball game being played somewhere – the very gist and
essence of the baseball business.”659 When later courts subjected broadcasting
agreements to antitrust scrutiny, they considered the issue with a misguided
interpretation of the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA).660
That Act exempts “any joint agreement . . . by which any league of clubs
participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests
sells . . . the rights of such league’s member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of
[their] games.”661 The Henderson court found broadcasting agreements not among
baseball’s unique characteristics and needs662 because its erroneous assessment
of the SBA led it to find “Congressional action does not support an extension of
the exemption to radio broadcasting.”663 The Henderson court held that because
the SBA does not differentiate between baseball and other major professional
sports, the Act restricted the scope of the baseball antitrust exemption to its own
scope.664 However, the SBA expressly states that it does not “affect the
applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to any . . . agreement . . .
except the agreements to which section 1291 of this title shall apply.”665 Hence,
656 SECTION OF ANTITRUST L., AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM
ANTITRUST LAW 149 (2007).
657 See Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 611–12 (showing that as early as 2009, more
fans watched baseball games online or on television than at a stadium); McDonald, supra note
31, at 112 (finding it “difficult to overestimate the role of broadcasting in the rise of baseball”).
658 Hale v. Brooklyn Baseball Club, Inc., Civ. Action No. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1958).
659 Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 268 n.7 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (quoting Hale, Civ. Action No. 1294).
660 Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95 (2012).
661 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
662 Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 263; see supra notes 571-77 and accompanying text (analyzing
the reasoning behind Henderson that held broadcasting rights are not part of baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs).
663 Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 265.
664 See id. at 269–70.
665 15 U.S.C. § 1294.
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just as the Curt Flood Act had no impact on the status of any matter under the
antitrust laws save MLB players,666 the SBA had no effect on the baseball
antitrust exemption beyond creating a limited statutory exemption.667
The Henderson court comes to this conclusion because it finds “broadcasting
. . . not central enough to baseball to be encompassed in the baseball
exemption.”668 The court provides two reasons for this assessment. First, neither
Toolson nor Flood had cited Gardella.669 By not engaging with Gardella, the Supreme
Court implied its agreement and intention to have that ruling stand.670 Second,
in International Boxing and Radovich, the Court “refus[ed] to extend the exemption
to other professional sports, in part because of the interstate broadcasting of the
sports.”671 While the Supreme Court considered broadcasting in these cases, the
question in International Boxing was “not whether a previously granted exemption
should continue, but whether an exemption should be granted in the first
instance.”672 The Radovich Court limited the exemption to “the business of . . .
baseball,”673 refusing to extend it to football. The reasoning in Henderson does
not justify excluding broadcasting rights from the exemption a priori.
While the first experimental radio broadcasts of baseball games had occurred
before Federal Baseball,674 the advent of radio and television took place between
Federal Baseball and Toolson.675 At the time of Federal Baseball, “each league had a
contract with a telegraph company for service” to transmit game results across
the nation, but the leagues did not generate profits from those transmissions.676
Similar to Justice Holmes’s characterization of transporting players across state
borders, the transmissions were “a mere incident” and “not enough to change
the character of the business” of baseball.677 When Toolson extended antitrust
protection to the entire business of baseball, regardless of any restrictions in
Federal Baseball, radio and television broadcasting had become an integral part of
that business,678 and broadcasting agreements are exempt from the antitrust
laws.679

See supra notes 478-86 and accompanying text (analyzing the Curt Flood Act).
Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 616–17.
668 Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 265.
669 Id. at 267.
670 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 615.
671 Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 267–68.
672 United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243 (1955).
673 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957).
674 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 568 n.55.
675 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 272 (1972).
676 Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 269 F. 681, 683
(D.C. Cir. 1920).
677 Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
209 (1922).
678 See supra Section I.C.2.
679 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
666
667
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2. Licensing Agreements
Not even the MLB and MLBPA claim antitrust exemptions for their licensing
agreements. In a suit over licensing agreements that allegedly violated the
Sherman Act, Major League Baseball Properties moved for summary judgment
instead of asserting its antitrust exemption.680 Similarly, the MLBPA did not
invoke the exemption when its contract with a baseball card manufacturer led to
an antitrust suit over a licensing agreement.681Hypothetically, licensing
agreements could be part of baseball’s antitrust exemption regardless of
Organized Baseball’s view. For instance, despite the Commerce Clause barring
the states from regulating professional baseball, Organized Baseball has not
invoked the exemption in all cases concerning state laws.682
Just as the production and sale of movie merchandise is separate from the
production of a movie, baseball licensing agreements are separate from the
business of baseball. Licensing revenue might contribute to financing the second
part of a multi-movie series, but the production company only receives income
from merchandise after it has concluded production of the first film and
distributed it to cinemas. Similarly, the sale of baseball merchandise results from
past activities on the field. Even if licensing revenue contributes to future onfield activities, those agreements have no closer connection to the business of
baseball than the owners’ investments in their respective teams. Under the test
proposed in the article,683 licensing agreements are not part of the business of
baseball and are hence subject to antitrust scrutiny.684
3. Sponsorship Agreements and Concessions
For similar reasons, Nathaniel Grow argues that sponsorship agreements and
concessions “are only tangentially related to the baseball exhibitions themselves.
Indeed, unlike other aspects of the baseball business . . . neither the existence nor
quality of the actual on-field competition would necessarily change should
concessions and sponsorship agreements cease to exist.”685 In 2018, total MLB
sponsorship revenue exceeded $900 million,686 while the average player salary

680 See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 293–94 (2d Cir
2008).
681 See Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139, (3d Cir. 1981).
682 See infra Section III.E.
683 See supra Section III.A.
684 See Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 620-21 (reaching the same conclusion).
685 Grow, Business of Baseball, supra note 16, at 622.
686 Christina Gough, Major League Baseball (League and Teams) Sponsorship Revenue from 2010 to
2018 (in Million U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/380197/mlbsponsorship-revenue/ (last visited August 2, 2019).
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was $4.41 million.687 Arguing that an average of $30 million per team, almost
seven players’ combined salaries, would not affect the quality of on-field
competition requires a Blackmun-esque view of the game. Unlike licensing
agreements, sponsoring “create[s] an association among the sponsor, sponsee,
and sports fans” and it helps “achieve the marketing objectives of the sponsoring
company.”688 Thus, sponsoring directly affects the spectacle presented to the
public. An economic analysis of the relationship between professional sports,
sponsors, and the media in the U.S. and Ireland even showed that sponsorship
agreements have become arguably necessary for any professional sports
exhibition.689 As a requirement for the game of baseball itself, sponsorship
agreements are part of the business of baseball and therefore fall within the scope
of the antitrust exemption.
Additionally, only an overly detached view would find that concessions are
irrelevant to the business of providing baseball entertainment for the public. In
Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co.,690 a dispute over a concession
franchise contract,691 Finley claimed, inter alia, violations of antitrust laws.692 The
Ninth Circuit did not even consider the antitrust exemption.693 The players’
conduct during the game would likely not change if there were no peanuts, hot
dogs, or Cracker Jacks. While the quality of entertainment provided for the
public would decrease considerably, concessions are not part of the game of
baseball, but rather the link between the game and the business of baseball; they
are hence exempt from the antitrust laws.
E. STATE LAW

Generally, federal antitrust laws supplement state laws.694 However,
“[b]aseball is an exception to [this rule].”695 The Supreme Court expressly held
in Flood that the Commerce Clause prevents the states from regulating
Id.
Sanghak Lee & Seung-Chang Lee, The Influence of Sport Sponsorship Communication on Sport
Fans’ Rating of Retail Service Quality, 6 INT’L J. SPORT COMM. 312, 313 (2013) (internal citation
omitted).
689 Cf. Rosita Wolfe, Tony Meenaghan & Paul O’Sullivan, Sport, Media and Sponsor—The
Shifting Balance of Power in the Sports Network, 10, No. 2 IR. MARKETING REV., 53, 55 (1997/98).
690 Twin City Sportserv., Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (1975).
691 Id. at 1268–69.
692 Id. at 1268.
693 See id. at 1269–76 (making no mention of the antitrust exemption); see also City of San
Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d. 686, 690 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding the
opinion in Twin City “without any reference to the baseball exemption”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
36 (2015).
694 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co.,
336 U.S 490, 495 (1949).
695 San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690 (second alteration in original) (quoting ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S.
at 102).
687
688
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professional baseball even if Organized Baseball has not always invoked its
exemption in this regard, citing not just the earlier cases in the baseball trilogy
but also Shubert, International Boxing, and Radovich.696 Thus, the exemption
prevents the states from subjecting baseball to their respective antitrust laws.
V.

CONCLUSION

The antitrust exemption broadly addresses the business of baseball.
Diverging approaches by the lower courts highlight certain aspects of that
business, but any restriction beyond the limits of that business violates the
Supreme Court precedent. Despite some muddled aspects of dubious intellectual
honesty, the baseball trilogy has a logical inner structure that the Court is unlikely
to overrule.
In order to elucidate this point, it is helpful to return to the concept of
rubbing mud discussed earlier within this article. Even if Japanese manufacturers
were to begin producing game-ready baseballs,697 American baseball teams
would be unlikely to give up on their rubbing mud. Abandoning the practice
would not just end a long-standing tradition but would shift the balance of power
between hitters and pitchers.698 By way of analogy, Federal Baseball corresponds
to the “clean” baseball within the baseball trilogy.699
Accordingly, reverting to Federal Baseball would significantly extend antitrust
scrutiny over the business of baseball and shift the balance against Organized
Baseball. In Federal Baseball, the Supreme Court did not just exempt baseball from
the antitrust laws; rather, the Court held that professional baseball did not
constitute interstate commerce in 1922 and therefore was not subject to the
Sherman Act.700 Toolson followed, creating the baseball antitrust exemption in a
ruling that ostensibly only upheld, but effectively all but overruled, Federal
Baseball.701 While its intention might have been limited to creating a baseball
antitrust exemption within congressional jurisdiction, the instrumentalist Toolson
Court created the exemption in all its aspects through its logically inevitable
implications. Finally, Flood expressively laid out those aspects and consolidated
the trilogy with the Supreme Court decisions that held other professional teams

Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284–85 (1972).
See Krest, supra note 2.
698 Id.(noting that hitters prefer to hit whiter balls).
699 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
700 Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
701 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
696
697
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sports subject to antitrust scrutiny.702 Whether Justice Blackmun favored the
opinion simply for its subject matter, or whether his ode to baseball still diverts
the attention from the Court’s exceptional prospective lawmaking power, Flood
made no law. Instead, it expressively defined baseball’s antitrust exemption and
included state antitrust laws into its scope, thus ensuring its survival and
concluding the baseball trilogy. As one can see, throughout the baseball trilogy,
the Supreme Court steadily strengthened the exemption and made clear that only
Congress could restrict or abolish it.
That trilogy exempts the entire business of baseball from federal and state
antitrust laws. Namely, the MiLB reserve system, employment terms of umpires,
scouts, coaches, and managers, the league structures, the rules of the game,
concessions, and broadcasting and sponsorship agreements are exempt from
antitrust scrutiny. More restrictive approaches by the lower courts violate the
Supreme Court’s precedent. Nevertheless, by highlighting distinct aspects of the
business of baseball, they provide an easier approach to some parts of its scope.
Future courts can rely on the experience gained from those attempts, such as the
attempts of courts to delimit the business of baseball. The baseball antitrust
exemption might not be entirely logical, given that other professional team sports
still face antitrust scrutiny. Yet, in the famous words of its later unintentional ex
post creator, Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr.: “[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience.”703

702
703

Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009) (1881).
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